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For centuries, auctions have been used as an efficient market mechanism for selling 
or procuring goods. Over time, auctions have evolved from its very basic price call-
out form to the much more sophisticated simultaneous multi goods design, the bulk of 
this dramatic evolution taking place in the later part of the twentieth century.  Even 
though the earliest use of auction dates back to around 500 B.C. in history, proper 
scientific research aiming at improving the effectiveness or expanding the scope of 
this versatile market mechanism started around the 1960’s. The pioneering work of 
William Vickrey in 1961 opened the floodgates for mathematicians and economists 
alike, to study this fascinating market mechanism, and within a very short period of 
time, both the understanding of the mechanism and the scope of its application 
improved vastly.  Over these years, a huge mass of theoretical and empirical research 
has produced results that introduce newer auction designs and characterize the 
existing ones. This has also allowed scope for continued research in the field of 
  
auctions, thriving for improvements and solutions to yet-to-be answered questions. 
The main goal of this study is to accomplish just that; present improvements that try 
to address issues that have not been addressed yet. 
 
The dissertation is structured as follows. The first chapter highlights the progress that 
has been made in the field of auctions and introduces the advancements made in the 
more recent field of auction experiments. This serves as an introduction to the other 
chapters and briefly outlines the important findings both in the traditional theoretical 
literature, the more recent operational research literature and the alternative 
experimental literature. The second chapter introduces a new auction model designed 
to tackle a specific problem encountered in multiple homogeneous goods auctions, 
which has not been dealt with satisfactorily thus far. The last chapter presents an 
extension of the existing auction experiment methodologies in an attempt to reveal 
possible weaknesses in earlier auction experiments and to improve our understanding 
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Chapter 1.  Introduction: Auctions and Experiments 
1.1. Progress in the field of Auctions 
From the very early days of human civilization, auctions have been serving as an 
important market design, the first use of auction dating back to as early as 500 B.C. 
Historical accounts of auction usage are widespread, ranging from the property and 
estate goods auctions employed by the Romans to the fund-raising auctions used by 
the Chinese monks. More recent accounts would be from the late 17th and the early 
18th century, when the first auction houses were created in the England. Auctions 
have been used extensively since then not only for selling artworks or collectibles, but 
also for varied purposes like century old practices of selling flowers and fish, to more 
modern ones like selling radio-wave spectrums, electricity and oil field drilling rights, 
to name a few. However, even though there are numerous accounts of auction usage 
throughout history as an efficient market mechanism, there is no account of any 
scientific research studying the working of an auction before the twentieth century. 
The pioneering work that opened the floodgates for mathematicians and economists 
alike, to study this fascinating market mechanism, would be the seminal work of 
William Vickrey in 1961. Since then, progress in the field of auctions has been 
overwhelming. Over these years, auction theorists have studied and developed 
designs for single unit, multiple identical units, multiple heterogeneous units and 
more recently, packaged units auctions. Irrespective of the auction environment, the 
main issues addressed by the auction-design literature have been allocative efficiency 





In a single object environment, the two most coveted auctions that take care of these 
two issues are the English auction and the Vickrey auction, though studies reveal the 
desirability and prevalence of the former over the latter (McAfee and McMillan,1987, 
Milgrom,1987). The rationales provided by the literature for this phenomenon are 
simply the strategic advantages that the open ascending bid English auction enjoy 
over the closed sealed bid Vickrey auction. Firstly, there is an informational 
advantage enjoyed by the bidders in an ascending open auction because they can 
observe the bids placed by the other bidders after every round and can update their 
future actions accordingly (Milgrom and Weber, 1982). Also, in an ascending bid 
auction, all that is revealed is the second highest valuation and the winner gets to 
preserve his own valuation for the object. This privacy preservation property of an 
open ascending bid auction has important implications. Since the winner does not 
have to reveal her own valuation, she feels insulated from any kind of manipulation 
by the auctioneer and feels less vulnerable for future negotiations.  
 
One of the most important and effective pricing rule prescribed by the auction 
literature is the one first conceptualized by Vickrey in 1961, where the price paid by a 
bidder is independent of that bidder’s bid. The simplest argument in favor of this 
simple yet effective rule is the fact that since a bidder’s bid has no effect on her price, 
there is every incentive for the bidder to bid truthfully. Indeed, in all the auction 
forms where the pricing rule satisfies this property, like the open English or the 




outcome is efficient. Truthful bidding is given so much importance by auction 
designers because it helps to achieve an efficient allocation. In a multi-unit auction, a 
special form of this rule is used which is also known as the Vickrey pricing rule. The 
price the winning bidder pays under such a rule for each unit she wins is exactly equal 
to the opportunity cost of assigning this unit to that bidder. In other words, the bidder 
gets to keep the marginal valuation she adds to the auction by being a part of it, which 
is better known as the bidder’s marginal product. The Vickrey prices paid by a bidder 
are always independent of her own bid, which encourages the bidder to bid truthfully. 
However, the sealed bid multiple-unit auction that Vickrey designed required the 
bidders to reveal their entire demand schedule. Later, Ausubel devised an open 
ascending auction for multiple units of the same good that mimicked Vickrey’s 
results and showed that prices in his auction matched that of Vickrey’s (An Efficient 
Ascending-Bid auction for Multiple Objects, AER).  
 
Another aspect of the auction literature, especially relevant for the multi-unit case, is 
the reliance on the substitutes property or the gross substitutes condition. Essentially, 
what it means is that each of the multiple units of the single good or the multiple 
goods offered for sale has to be treated like substitutes by all the bidders. This turns 
out to be one of the important properties that need to be satisfied in order to reach 
equilibrium in such auction models. In the multiple-unit single good case, this simply 
requires the bidders to have non-increasing marginal valuations and in the multiple 




is not always realistic. A simple example that illustrates this in the case of multiple-
unit single good case is as follows. 
 
Suppose we have a spectrum license auction where six spectrum licenses of the same 
frequency are being auctioned off. There are four bidders out of which three are well-
established “big players” in that market and one firm that is a new entrant to this 
market. The three incumbent firms, quite understandably, treat all the licenses as 
substitutes, meaning they have non-increasing marginal utilities for the six licenses. 
However, the smaller firm, since it is a new entrant, might require a certain number of 
licenses, let’s suppose three, to set up a proper network needed to operate 
successfully. Under such circumstances, the smaller firm should treat the first three 
licenses as complements and thus should have increasing marginal valuations over 
these units. When confronted with such a situation, the existing ascending auction 
designs fail to produce an efficient outcome, the main reason for such a failure being 
the non-existence of a Walrasian equilibrium price at which demand is exactly equal 
to the supply. 
 
In recent times, a vastly developing field of auction theory has been combinatorial 
auctions, which deals with multiple goods bundled as packages. In fact, the popularity 
of combinatorial auctions have transcended the field of economics and crossed over 
to operations research and even computer science. In this area of combinatorial 
auctions with package bidding, Ausubel and Milgrom, 2002, have studied the results 




of operations research, Bikhchandani and Ostroy, 2002, Bikhchandani et al, 2001, 
Parkes and Ungar, 2002, and Parkes and Mishra, 2004 have papers devoted to the 
computational solution of a similar problem in a multiple goods setting using linear 
programming techniques. In all of these studies, the auction problem is interpreted as 
a linear programming problem with the objective to compute the equilibrium outcome 
using primal-dual algorithms. However, the issues addressed in these studies differ 
not only in nature with those studied in this paper, but also in the way they are 
treated. Combinatorial auction models are much more complex models, which look at 
multiple goods auctioned off as packages. The solution techniques not only involve 
demanding mathematical rigor, but also tackle the problem solely from the 
computational aspect, especially those in operations research. Though the multiple 
unit single good model studied in this paper can be perceived as a special case of the 
broader class of combinatorial auction models, applying the linear programming 
techniques to solve such a model not only unnecessarily complicates matters but also 
is highly inefficient in terms of the technicalities involved. 
 
1.2. Auction Experiments 
Even though experimental economics has been a relatively new branch of applied and 
behavioral economics, there has been a considerable amount of research dedicated to 
studying different auction design in laboratory settings. The main focus of such experiments 
has been to study the “Revenue Equivalence”, “Strategic Equivalence”, or certain behavioral 




studies related to sealed and open bid auction designs and will try to bring to the reader’s 
attention an important issue which has not be addressed so far. 
 
One of the most fundamental guidelines for designing an effective auction, as prescribed by 
the auction literature, has been an open structure of bidding, which maximizes the 
information made available to each bidder at the time of bidding1. Another important attribute 
of open auctions is privacy-preservation. While all the bidders are asked to reveal their entire 
demand schedule in a sealed bid auction, the winning bidders do not have to reveal their 
values in an open auction. Michael H. Rothkopf, Thomas J. Teisberg, and Edward P. Kahn 
(1990) pointed out that due to this fact, if the bidders apprehend cheating by the auctioneer or 
if there are going to be subsequent auctions or negotiations, bidders will be more reluctant to 
reveal their true values in sealed bid auctions. Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Charles M. 
Kahn (1991) and Rothkopf and Harstad (1995) also provide models emphasizing the 
importance of protecting the privacy of winners’ valuations. In fact, for single-object 
environments, studies have revealed the desirability and prevalence of ascending open bid 
English auctions over the closed sealed bid version (see, for example, the excellent surveys of 
R. Preston McAfee and John McMillan, 1987, and Milgrom, 1987).   
 
A considerable amount of experimental work has been done which address different issues in 
multiunit auction designs. Early work by Miller and Plott, 1985, compared revenue raising 
aspect of uniform and pay-your-bid auctions. James C. Cox et al., 1984, 1985 and Kevin A. 
McCabe et al., 1990, 1991, have used laboratory experiment to study multiunit auctions with 
single unit demand. More recent studies, like that of Paul Alsemgeest et al., 1998, address the 
important issue of demand reduction in multiunit auctions.  List and Reiley, 2000, have 
studied demand reduction in multiunit auctions in a field experiment where they use naturally 
                                                 




occurring data from a sports card show. In their paper, they compare outcomes from a 
uniform auction to those from a Vickrey auction. Kagel and Levin, 2001, address this same 
issue of demand reduction in multiunit auctions in a laboratory setting where they compare 
outcomes from both a sealed bid and an open bid uniform auction to the dynamic Ausubel 
auction. More closely related to this study would be Kagel, Kinross and Levin, 2001, where 
outcomes from the sealed bid Vickrey auction are compared to those from two versions of the 
dynamic Ausubel auction in the absence of complementarities. To complete this list would be 
the studies by Grimm and Engelmann, 2002, experimentally comparing five auction formats, 
and Manelli, Sefton and Wilner, 1999, comparing Vickrey with Ausubel auction using 
bidders with interdependent values. 
 
The choice between an ascending open-bid and a closed sealed-bid auction has been one of 
the most debated topics in auction theory. Though the standard auction literature prescribes 
the ascending auction over the sealed-bid one, experimental studies have shown that the latter 
outperforms the former, both in laboratory and in field settings. Theoretically, the ascending 
auction design is more appealing compared to its sealed-bid counterpart because it does not 
require the bidders to reveal their entire demand, thus insulating them from any possible 
manipulation by the auctioneer. In addition, due to its dynamic nature, the bidders can update 
their information set every period to ensure more efficient bidding. However, experimental 
studies have shown that the sealed bid format outperforms the open bid one, both in 
laboratory and in field settings. In such experiments, bidders are found to be bidding more 
aggressively in sealed bid auctions which contradicts the theoretical predictions directly (see 
Kagel, 1995 and Davis and Holt, 1993 for useful surveys of auction theory and laboratory 
experiments). Cox et al., 1985, Kagel et al., 1987, and Kagel and Levin, 1993 have all 
observed overbidding in sealed bid laboratory studies. Kagel and Levin, 2001, find 




laboratory setting. List and Reiley, 2001, observe this same result of overbidding on the first 
unit in a sealed bid uniform auction, in a field experiment using data from a sports card show.  
Broadly speaking, these discrepancies can be categorized into three stylized facts. Firstly, 
subjects consistently bid more aggressively than predicted by theory in sealed bid first price 
auctions with independent private valuations.2 Secondly, subjects consistently bid more 
aggressively than predicted by theory in sealed bid second price auctions.3 Finally, strategic 
equivalence between English auctions and second-price sealed bid auctions fails, with far less 
overbidding in English auctions than in second price sealed bid auctions.4 
 
To reconcile these anomalous results with standard theoretical predictions, a variety of 
explanations have been offered. For first price auctions, it can be shown theoretically that if 
bidders are risk averse, there would be over bidding. Riley and Samuelson, 1981, showed that 
bidders engage in aggressive bidding in first price auctions with risk averse preferences. 
Though this potentially might explain the first discrepancy, it completely fails to explain 
overbidding relative to the dominant strategy in second price auctions. More qualitative 
explanations are advanced by Kagel, Harstad and Levin, 1987, where they point out the 
difference in feedback from overbidding in the two auction formats as a possible source of 
overbidding. They argue that since the impact of overbidding is much more immediate in 
open auctions as compared to the closed ones, overbidding is more common in the latter. 
More recently, some behavioral studies have also tried to explain these discrepancies. 
Ettinger, 2002, and Das Varma, 2002, both study auctions where a winning bidder might 
exert externality on a losing bidder. In Ettinger’s paper, the winning bidder has incentive to 
bid more aggressively whereas the losing bidder has incentive to over bid in Das Varma’s 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Holt and Sherman, 2000, who give explicit graphs of measured bid functions in this 
  case. 
3 See, for example, Kagel, Harstad, and Levin, 1987. 
4 Again, see Kagel, Harstad, and Levin, 1987 for a good example of clear experimental evidence of this 




paper. Morgan et al., 2003, model a spite motive in bidders’ preferences which successfully 
explains the discrepancies. In their model, the losing bidder has spiteful incentives which lead 
to aggressive bidding.  
Thus we see that there exists a wide variety of studies trying to explain the observed 
discrepancies. However, a seemingly important aspect has been overlooked from all of these 
studies. The whole premise of superiority of the ascending auction designs rests on the fact 
that less information is revealed in such auctions, which prevents any kind of price 
manipulation or other foul play by the auctioneer. Michael H. Rothkopf, Thomas J. Teisberg, 
and Edward P. Kahn, 1990, pointed out that if the bidders apprehend cheating by the 
auctioneer or if there are going to be subsequent auctions or negotiations, bidders will be 
more reluctant to reveal their true values in sealed bid auctions. Richard Engelbrecht-
Wiggans and Charles M. Kahn (1991), and Rothkopf and Harstad (1995) also provide models 
emphasizing the importance of protecting the privacy of winners’ valuations. However, none 
of the experimental studies have tried to capture this aspect of manipulation by the 
auctioneer. In all these experiments, the experimenter herself is the auctioneer, which right 
away rules out any apprehension about possible foul play by the auctioneer. With the 
experimenter acting as the auctioneer, this is nothing but natural. The experimenter is 
obligated to compute the prices and the allocation according to the rules disclosed at the 
beginning of the experiment. Thus, the most important rationale favoring the open auction 
over the sealed bid auction has not been experimentally verified yet, which also appears to be 
a realistic one.  
 
1.3.  Reconciling Theory and Experiment 
The main goal of this study is a two-pronged approach. The second chapter presents an 




values. This auction mechanism is an extension of the dynamic Ausubel auction, 
which successfully implements the efficient outcome with non-increasing marginal 
values. The Ausubel auction algorithm breaks down in settings with increasing 
marginal values, due to the non-existence of a Walrasian equilibrium price. The 
proposed dynamic auction achieves efficiency in such auction environments, and like 
all dynamic auctions, does not require the bidders to fully express their demand 
curves. We use the VCG prices, inducing truthful bidding as a best response strategy. 
We first consider a setting in which a single bidder has increasing marginal values, 
and then examine the general case of several bidders with increasing marginal values.       
The distinguishing feature of this new auction is the fact that it is an open ascending bid 
auction. To the best of our knowledge, this would be the only ascending auction design that 
would be able to achieve efficiency even with increasing marginal values. However, since the 
same efficient outcome could also be achieved with a sealed bid auction, it is imperative to 
show how and why an open auction should be favored over a sealed bid auction. Even though 
the auction design literature strongly favors the open auction over the sealed bid auction, 
several experimental studies have produced results that are quite the opposite. Thus the 
second feature of this dissertation is a study that complements the first part and tries to 
establish the theoretical superiority of the open auction in a laboratory setting. Using a new 
approach to auction experiments, the main objective of the experimental study is to observe 
bidding behavior in sealed bid auctions and rationalize the theoretical claims by means of 
statistical inference. In this paper, we studied the effect of price manipulation by the 
auctioneer on the bidding behavior in a sealed bid auction. Our results suggest that bidding 
behavior in the sealed bid auction format is affected by possible price manipulation by the 
auctioneer. As expected, we have a much larger effect with explicit manipulation. Both with 




manipulation, second price auction bidding. Based on these preliminary findings, we are 
confident enough that our new experiment design might be applied more extensively to 
validate the theoretical claim of superiority of open auctions over sealed bid auctions on the 
premise that bidders bid sub-optimally in fear of price manipulation in sealed bid auctions. To 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that tries to analyze this experimentally. As a 
possible source of future research, we would ideally want to expand the scope this present 
study and analyze similar situations in a field experiment setting. One such possibility would 
be online auctions, which might be used to study this phenomenon 
 
Chapter two of this dissertation introduces the new ascending open bid auction design that 
could be used to achieve efficiency even with increasing marginal values. Apart from the 
theoretical model and the formal algorithm, it also presents an illustrative example. The third 
and the last chapter presents the experimental study where the new auction experiment is 














This paper introduces an ascending price auction design for multiple homogeneous 
goods in a private value setting, where the bidders might exhibit complementarities. 
These are auctions where multiple units of the same good are sold, like spectrum 
license auctions of the same frequency or treasury bill auctions of the same 
denomination. In such auction environments, complementarities are captured by 
increasing marginal values. The proposed algorithm, unlike any of the existing 
ascending price auction designs, achieves the efficient allocation in such auctions 
with increasing marginal values. The contribution of this work is twofold. It allows 
the bidders to exhibit increasing marginal values. This is of utmost importance 
because the auction literature does not provide a satisfactory answer to this specific 
problem of complementarities in multiple homogeneous good auctions. Equally 
important is the fact that it is an ascending bid auction design, which several studies 
have revealed to be more prevalent and more desirable than its sealed-bid 
counterpart5.    
 
The multiunit sealed-bid Vickrey6 is the only existing auction design that can allocate 
the units efficiently without requiring the values to be non-increasing. Another 
desirable feature of the Vickrey auction is the fact that truthful bidding is an 
                                                 
5 See McAfee and McMillan, 1987, and Milgrom, 1987 




equilibrium strategy. However, being a sealed bid auction, it requires the bidders to 
reveal their entire demand, which has been shown to have a negative effect on the 
bidding behavior7. Consequently, efforts have been made to replicate the static 
sealed-bid Vickrey results in a dynamic setting but with very limited success. In fact, 
the only dynamic auction design that successfully replicated the static Vickery 
outcome was devised by Ausubel in 20048. This ascending price auction does not 
require the bidders to reveal their entire demand to compute the efficient allocation. 
However, the efficiency of this design is severely restricted to non-increasing 
marginal values only. In fact, there does not exist any dynamic multiunit auction 
design that would replicate the static Vickrey results in a more general increasing 
marginal values setting. This paper attempts to bridge this gap by introducing a 
multiunit auction design that extends the Vickrey results to a more general dynamic 
setting.  
 
Though complementarities are usually associated with heterogeneous goods, 
increasing marginal values cannot be ruled out in homogeneous good auctions. For 
example, one of the bidders in a multiunit pollution permit auction might require a 
minimum number of permits for optimal production; or one of the bidders in a 
multiunit spectrum license auction might require a minimum number of licenses to set 
up a proper network. In both these two cases, the aforementioned bidders would have 
increasing marginal values. The presence of such bidders in multiunit auctions could 
be a serious problem. Even with only one such bidder, there would be an indivisible 
                                                 
7 See Milgrom and Weber, 1982, Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn , 1991, and Rothkopf and Harstad , 
1995 




bid for the units of complementarities. This would make the aggregate demand curve 
discontinuous, implying that a Walrasian equilibrium price, at which demand is equal 




With a non-existent equilibrium price, the existing ascending price auctions fail to 
achieve the efficient allocation and might also lead to the Exposure problem9. 
However, this does not pose a threat for the proposed auction design because it does 
not require a market clearing price to compute the efficient allocation.  
 
In any auction design, prices play an extremely important role in determining the 
bidding strategies. One of the most important and effective pricing rule prescribed by 
                                                 
9 Exposure problem refers to the situation where a bidder gets only a part of her package and is asked 






Fig. 2.1.A: Continuous Case Fig. 2.1.B: Discrete Case 
Fig. 2.1:  Discontinuous Demand. The supply curve intersects the demand curve at the 





the auction literature is the one first conceptualized by Vickrey in 1961, where the 
price paid by a bidder is independent of her own bid. The most convincing argument 
in favor of this simple yet effective rule is the fact that since a bidder’s bid has no 
effect on her price, there is every incentive for the bidder to bid truthfully. In a 
multiunit auction, a special form of this rule is used which is known as the Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (VCG)10 mechanism. The payment of the winning bidder under such a 
mechanism, for each unit she wins, is exactly equal to the opportunity cost of 
assigning this unit to that bidder. In other words, the bidder gets to keep the marginal 
value she adds to the auction by being a part of it, which is better known as the 
bidder’s marginal product. The VCG prices paid by a bidder are always independent 
of  her own bid, which encourages the bidders to bid truthfully. The prices the 
winning bidders pay in the proposed auction are the VCG payments. Consequently, 
this implies that the bidders should bid truthfully. 
 
In recent times, a vastly developing field of auction theory has been combinatorial 
auctions, which deals with multiple goods bundled as packages. In fact, the popularity 
of combinatorial auctions have transcended the field of economics and crossed over 
to operations research and even computer science. In this area of combinatorial 
auctions with package bidding, Ausubel and Milgrom, 2002, have studied the results 
of relaxing the gross substitute property in their proxy auction. Similarly, in the field 
of operations research, Bikhchandani and Ostroy, 2002, Bikhchandani et al, 2001, 
Parkes and Ungar, 2002, and Parkes and Mishra, 2004 have papers devoted to the 
computational solution of a similar problem in a multiple goods setting using linear 
                                                 




programming techniques. In all of these studies, the auction problem is interpreted as 
a linear programming problem with the objective to compute the equilibrium outcome 
using primal-dual algorithms. However, the issues addressed in these studies differ 
not only in nature with those studied in this paper, but also in the way they are 
treated. Combinatorial auction models are much more complex models, which look at 
multiple goods auctioned off as packages. The solution techniques not only involve 
demanding mathematical rigor, but also tackle the problem solely from the 
computational aspect, especially those in operations research. Though the multiple 
unit single good model studied in this paper can be perceived as a special case of the 
broader class of combinatorial auction models, applying the linear programming 
techniques to solve such a model not only unnecessarily complicates matters but also 
is highly inefficient in terms of the technicalities involved. The auction design 
presented here conforms to this need for a simpler and intuitive model without all the 
technical rigor, for the special case of increasing marginal values. 
 
The main model is discussed broadly in two parts. The first part deals with the case 
where one bidder with increasing marginal values is present. The second part deals 
with multiple bidders with complementarities. This is done solely to facilitate the 
understanding of the model, even though the first part can be treated as a special case 
of the second. The auctioneer does not need to know whether there is a single bidder 
or multiple bidders with complementarities ex ante. The single bidder algorithm can 




auctioneer receives the relevant information. The only reason for the above 
mentioned categorization is simplicity of exposition. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: Some preliminary intuitive ideas and an 
illustrative example are presented in the next section. The general model with single 
increasing value bidder is discussed in the section that follows. The auction 
algorithm, which shows how to compute the allocation and the prices, is presented in 
the next section. In the following section, the numerical example is revisited to 
explain how the auction works. Multiple bidders with complementarities are 
discussed next followed by a section on linear programming. In the concluding 
section, some experimental findings are presented along with the scope of future 
research. Proofs of theorems are relegated to the appendix at the end of the paper. 
 
2.2.  A Numerical Example and Some Intuitive Insights 
 
Let us suppose that in a spectrum license auction 6 identical blocks of licenses of the 
same bandwidth are being auctioned off. There are 4 bidders out of which 3 are well-
established incumbent in that market. The fourth firm is a new entrant. The new 
entrant might require a certain number of licenses, let us suppose 3, to set up a proper 
network needed to operate successfully. Under such circumstances, the entrant should 
treat the first 3 licenses as complements and thus should have increasing marginal 
valuations over these units. Table 2.1 depicts such a situation where B1 is the entrant 



















B1: 0 0 18 2 2 2 
B2: 13 10 2 2 2 2 
B3: 12 4 2 2 2 2 
B4: 11 5 2 2 2 2 
 
When confronted with such a situation, the existing ascending auction designs fail to 
produce an efficient outcome, the main reason for such a failure being the non-
existence of a Walrasian equilibrium price at which demand is exactly equal to the 
supply. Table 2.2 shows what would happen if a standard ascending price auction is 
used to allocate the 6 licenses among the 4 bidders. 
 











0 6 6 6 6 24 
2 3 2 2 2 9 
4 3 2 1 2 8 
5 3 2 1 1 7 





Clearly, there does not exist a price at which demand is equal to supply; the demand 
is greater than the supply for all prices equal to or less than 5 and the demand is less 
than supply for all prices above 5. Therefore, the standard ascending auctions break 
down under such situations and fail to render an equilibrium outcome.  
 
In instances like these, the non-existence of the equilibrium price can be solely 
attributed to the fact that the bidder with complementarities is the marginal bidder. A 
marginal bidder is the bidder who has the Mth highest value in an M unit auction. For 
example, if the top 6 values in a 6 units auction are 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8, then the 
bidder with the value 8 is the marginal bidder. If a bidder with complementarities is 
the marginal bidder, then her average value for the units of complementarities is the 
M
th highest value. For example, if the top 6 values in a 6 units auction are: 13, 12, 11, 
10, 6, 6, 6, then the bidder with the average value 6 for 3 units of complementarities 
is the marginal bidder. This particular type of bidders would always have an all-or-
nothing bid for the units of complementarities. This would lead to a multiunit 
reduction in demand at the margin, resulting in a shift to excess supply directly from 
excess demand, without demand equaling supply ever. Figure 1 depict situations like 
these in a continuous and a discrete framework. 
 
The allocation problem in auctions like these, with single bidder complementarities, 
essentially is to decide how to allocate units at the margin. In an auction where M 




it is of utmost importance for any allocation mechanism to determine how to allocate 
these K marginal units in order to compute the efficient allocation. The simplest way 
to look at this problem is to consider the following thought experiment. Instead of 
having one auction, let us suppose there are two sequential auctions where M – K 
units are being auctioned off in the first auction and the remaining K units are being 
sold in the second one. Assuming truthful bidding, this would imply that bidders with 
top M – K bids are allotted M – K units in the first auction. Thus, the allocation 
problem that the auctioneer faces in the second auction, where only K units are being 
sold, would be exactly similar to the marginal allocation problem the auctioneer 
would face in the original M unit auction. I call this hypothetical reduced version of 
the M unit auction where K units are sold, the Marginal Auction Problem or MAP. It 
is absolutely necessary for any ascending auction design to solve the MAP efficiently 
if it is used to compute the efficient allocation in auctions like these. Even though the 
above exercise might seem to be a natural and easy way to solve this problem, it 
should be kept in mind that bidders would have incentive to reduce their demand 




   
                  
Figure 2.2 illustrates what would happen if there is an indivisible multiunit bid (the 
shaded region) by the marginal bidder. The MAP refers to the efficient allocation of 









     Price 
Fig. 2.3.B:  The units are allocated to bidders 
other than the marginal bidder  
Fig. 2.3:  The MAP Solutions 
Quantity 
Supply 
   Demand 
Fig. 2.2: Excess Demand and Excess Supply. Price starts from a very low value and increases 





Clearly, the issue of efficiency could be resolved trivially by comparing the area of 
the shaded regions in the diagrams above; larger area implying more efficient 
allocation. The auction design proposed in this paper replicates the exact same idea in 
an ascending auction framework to solve for the efficient allocation. 
 
An important issue worth mentioning before I conclude this section is the fact that 
presence of bidders with complementarities does not necessarily mean that demand-
equal-to-supply equilibrium does not exist. This would be the case only if the 
marginal bidder has increasing marginal values. The following diagrams illustrate this 




As I will show later, in cases like these, our new auction design exactly replicates the 






Fig. 2.4: Demand equal to Supply with Complementarities.  
Even with discontinuity due to complementarities, the supply curve intersects the demand curve at the 
continuous part, implying that there exists a price at which demand is equal to supply; in both these two 




2.3.  The General Model 
 
A seller has M units of a homogeneous good that she wishes to allocate among n 
bidders. Let N = {1,…,n} be the set of bidders. Bidder i’s valuation for the units she 
is assigned to is her private valuation, making this a private values model. Utility in 
this model is quasilinear, i.e., if a bidder i is assigned xi units of the good, then her 
utility equals her private value for the units she receive less the payment she has to 
make. For the simpler model, I assume that only one bidder has increasing marginal 
values for the first K(<<M) units and the rest of the bidders have non-increasing 
marginal valuations. However, later I am going to relax this assumption and allow for 
increasing marginal valuations for multiple bidders.  
 
The auction is an ascending clock auction where rounds are registered only when 
there is a change in demand. At every round t, the auctioneer announces a price Pt 
and each bidder i reports her demand itx . For the simplicity of exposition, let us 
assume that price advances in discrete steps and the bidders’ marginal valuations are 
taken from the same set of discrete values. For similar reasons, I am also going to 
assume that these values are distinct, implying that no bidder has same marginal value 









The bidding should satisfy the Monotone Activity Rule, which simply prevents any 
bidder to remain inactive throughout the initial stages and then bid towards the end of 
the auction. More specifically, for every bidder, demand in round t has to be lesser 





(1)     Monotone Activity Rule: 1
i i
t tx x −≤ , ∀ i, t 
 
Clinching, as defined by Ausubel11, is not permanent in this model. It might be the 
case that a unit clinched by a bidder in some earlier round is debited back after the 
final allocation. So I introduce provisional clinches in this model those are same as 
before with the only exception that they might be temporary. 
 
(2)    Provisional Cumulative Clinches by bidder i at round t;  






∑ },∀ i, t 




tC−           
Finally, I introduce the set of Drop-outs at every round t that gives the set of bidders 
who reduce their demand at that round. In other words, it is the set of bidders at round 
t whose demand is strictly less than their demand in round t – 1. An important point to 
note here is the fact that in accordance to the distinct, non-equal marginal values 
assumption, the set of Drop-outs are always going to be singleton sets. 
 
(4)     Drop-outs at round t; Dt = { i / 1
i i
t tx x −< } for every round t 
 
The way this model works is as follows: the auctioneer keeps on increasing the price 
as long as there is excess demand. In each of these bidding rounds, the provisional 
                                                 




clinches and the set of drop-outs are recorded. If the bidder with complementarities is 
not the marginal bidder, then demand would be equal to supply at some price. If that 
is the case, then the auction ends at that round. The provisional clinches become 
permanent and the allocation and prices are determined by the clinches made by the 
bidders and the clinching prices. In other words, in cases like these, the new auction 
exactly replicates the Ausubel ascending auction, producing the exact same outcome. 
Also, the amount of information revealed in our new auction would be exactly similar 
to the amount of information revealed in the Ausubel auction.  
 
Now let us suppose that the bidder with complementarities is the marginal bidder. 
This implies that the average value of the K units of complementarities is the 
marginal or the Mth value. Thus, as price increases, excess demand changes to excess 
supply. As noted before, in order to compute the efficient allocation, the auctioneer 
now has to determine  whether to allocate these K units to the marginal bidder or not. 
This decision problem is what was referred to as MAP earlier. To find an efficient 
solution to the MAP, more information is needed. More specifically, the auctioneer 
needs to know what value would be generated if these K units are allocated to bidders 
other than the marginal bidder. Now, the only source of information in ascending 
auctions is the drop out price, which is also the reported value of the dropped out 
unit12. Thus, to extract the necessary information, auctioneer needs to increase price 
further until demand exactly equals M – K units. One important issue here is the fact 
that the amount of information revealed in the auction depends on the difference 
between M and K. If the difference between M and K is small, then more information 
                                                 




is revealed and the new auction loses out on the strategic advantages that an 
ascending auction enjoys over a sealed bid auction. In fact, when K = M, this auction 
reduces to an ascending version of the sealed bid multiple-unit Vickrey auction where 
bidders are asked to reveal all their information. Thus, one caveat of this new auction 
is the fact that it requires the complementarities to be over fewer number of units 
compared to the number of units offered for sale to make it more effective than a 
sealed bid multiple-unit auction. This leads us to the first remark, which ranks 
auctions on the basis of information revealed. 
 
Remark 1:  
In terms of the information revealed, the auctions can be ranked as follows: 
Sealed Bid Multiunit Vickrey Auction ≥ New Ascending Auction ≥ Ausubel Auction 
 
The two extreme cases are sealed bid Vickrey Auction = New Ascending Auction 
when M = K,  and New Ascending Auction = Ausubel Auction when the bidder with 
complementarities is not the marginal bidder. Also as noted above, in the latter case, 




The New Auction exactly replicates the Ausubel Auction when the marginal bidder is 





The next section discusses in details the entire auction algorithm and the procedure to 
obtain the efficient allocation and the prices. 
 
2.4.  The Auction Algorithm 
 
Auction starts at round 1 with a price = 0. This is the round of initialization. Price 
continues to increase as long as there is excess demand, i.e., Xt  > M. Let us suppose 
that at round t*, excess demand changes to excess supply for the first time.  
                                i.e.,   Xt* < M and Xt*-1 > M 
The auctioneer increases the price further. The auction ends at round t  when
t
X  = M 
– K. In other words, when the auction ends, only the bidders with top M – K values 
remain active. In the first half of the allocation mechanism, these M – K units are 
allocated to the active bidders in the final round according to their respective 
demands. The second half of the allocation mechanism tackles the MAP and 
determines how to allocate the rest of the K units efficiently. The information 
collected from the bidding rounds, namely the drop out prices, are then used to 
calculate the prices the winning bidders should pay.  
 
To solve the MAP efficiently, the auction algorithm must provide the necessary 
information regarding the bidders’ values that is required to compute the efficient 
allocation. To be more precise, it is necessary to know the average value of the K 
units of complementarities of the marginal bidder and the K values this bidder is 




efficient allocation becomes a simple one. It can be achieved by comparing the total 
value of K units (the average value times K) for the bidder with complementarities 
and the sum of the remaining K values13. Obviously, the one that has a higher total 
value is chosen. Now, as noted earlier, the only source of information in our model is 
the drop-out prices. If the auction mechanism could be designed such that the bidders 
bid truthfully, then the prices at which the bidders reduce their demand would 
actually be equal to their marginal value for that unit. As will be shown in later 
sections, wait-till-price-equals-value strategy is an equilibrium strategy and 
consequently, the efficient allocation could be computed using specific drop-out 
prices.14. Also, without any loss of generality, from now on I will just use values to 
mean reported and/or true values and  prove that they are the same later, in Theorem 
3. 
  
Before I present the allocation and pricing mechanism, I need the following 
preliminaries. First, I need to determine round t  such that tX  = M + K – 1. 
Significantly, price at round t  gives us the lowest amongst the top M + K values. 
Now, by recording prices from round t  to round t  and excluding round t*, I can get 
the bottom K values excluding the bidder with complementarities. The important 
                                                 
13 This is very much similar to the idea of comparing areas under the demand curve which we did in 
Fig. 2.3.A and Fig. 2.3.B 
14 Out of the top M  + K values, it is necessary to know the bottom 2K values; Out of which we have  K 
units of complementarities and the remaining K values excluding the bidder with complementarities. 
The price at round t* gives the average value of the bidder with complementarities. To figure out the 
remaining K values, we need to look at K prices starting from the round when demand falls from M + 
K to M + K – 1 all the way up to the round when demand falls from M – K + 1 to M – K, excluding the 




assumption is that there is a single unit demand reduction in every round other than t*, 
where demand drops by K units. 
 
Next, for every round from round t  to round t , I have to determine the set of Drop-
outs Dt. 
                                          i.e., find Dt ∀ t  ∈ [ t , t ] 
The set of Drop-outs play an important role in the final allocation because they give 
us the identity of the bidder with complementarity ( *tD  ) and that of the other bidders 
she is competing against.  
 
Finally, the clinches15 made by the bidders have to be registered. In our model, any 
clinch made after round t  are redundant and thus are not recorded. Also, unlike the 
Ausubel auction, clinches in our model can be temporary. So Provisional Clinches, 
Ct, are determined for every round, starting from round 1 to round t . 
                                            i.e., find Ct ∀ t  ∈ [1, t ] 
 





                                                 






The M – K units that are demanded at round t  are allocated to the bidders who have 
positive demand at round t . The algorithm for allocating the rest of the K units is as 
follows: 













−∑ Pt* ; then j ∈  Dt*  gets the remaining K units 






−∑ Pt* ; then i ∈  Dt  gets 1 unit each ∀ t  ∈ [ t , t ], t ≠ t*.16 
For the time being, I postpone the discussion on efficiency of the proposed allocation 
and concentrate on the pricing mechanism used in this model. Later on, when I 




Arguably, the most important aspect of this model is the price. Following Vickrey’s 
notion of bid-independent prices, the amount a winning bidder pays in our model 
does not depend on her own bid. More specifically, the VCG payment mechanism for 
multiple units is used in this model. Thus, the price paid by bidder i is the opportunity 
                                                 
16 At every round t ≠ t*, there is a unit reduction in aggregate demand from the previous period. Now, 
including round t , there is 2K unit reduction in demand between round t and t , out of which K unit 
reduction occurs at round t*. Thus, there is a reduction of K units from rounds t  to t , excluding 
round t* and for every such round, 1 unit is being awarded to the bidder who has reduced her demand 
in these rounds. Thus, K units are allocated between rounds t and t , and M - K units are allocated at 





cost of assigning those units to that particular bidder, and is computed from bids other 
than that of i. Mathematically, the price paid by bidder i conforms to the following 
formula; 
                                                        pi = V(N/i) – ∑
≠ij
jv  
where V(N/i) represents the total value generated by the efficient allocation without 
bidder i and ∑
≠ij
jv represents the total value generated by the bidders other than i 
under the efficient allocation with bidder i. Thus, the important task here is to 
construct a pricing mechanism that conforms to the above principle. There are two 
price computational algorithms one for each distinct case of possible allocations. 
These are as follows: 
 














−∑ Pt* . Bidders 
other than j get whatever they demand at the last round., i.e., bidder i ≠ j gets i
t
x  units. 
Now, let Ri be the sum of the prices in the last itx  rounds where i ∉  Dt , excluding 
round t*. Bidder i pays Ri .  












                    
Here bidder j ∈  Dt* gets zero unit. Now, let yi be the number of units awarded to 
bidder i ≠ j. If  yi > K then i pays KPt*  for K units and the clinching prices for the rest 
of  yi – K units. If yi = K then i pays KPt* . Let us suppose yi < K. Let Ti be the sum of 
K – yi  prices in rounds where i ∉  Dt , starting from round t , excluding round t*. 
Then bidder i pays pi = KPt*  – Ti .  As before, only Provisional Current Clinches 
made by bidder i ≠ j in rounds t < t are honored. 
 
Thus, the prices are indeed independent of one’s own bid and are computed solely 
using bids from other bidders. The next theorem uses this property of the price 




In this auction model, truthful bidding or wait-until-price-equals-value bidding 
strategy is a best response equilibrium strategy. 
 
Proof:  See Appendix. 
 
Now, what remains is to show that the prices computed here are actually VCG prices, 




Theorem 1, it can be shown that the prices computed before are indeed the VCG 
payments.  
 







In this case, bidder j ∈  Dt*, the bidder with complementarities, gets K units. 
According to the VCG principle, the price has to equal the opportunity cost of 
assigning these K units to bidder j, independent of her own bid. To calculate the 
opportunity cost of allocating these K units to bidder j, the next best alternative needs 
to be determined. Now, with truthful bidding or wait-until-price-equals-value bidding 
strategy, the K highest rejected bids (or simply, the drop-out prices) other than that of 
bidder j would give us the opportunity cost. Incidentally, the K highest rejected bids 
happen to be the K drop-out prices from round t  to round t , excluding round t*.17 






−∑ Pt* , which is exactly what our 
algorithm proposes. 
 
Bidders other than j get whatever they demand at the last round., i.e., bidder i ≠ j gets 
i
t
x  units. Now, to calculate the VCG price for bidder i, the opportunity cost of 
allocating the i
t
x  units to bidder i needs to be determined. Like before, this implies 
that the highest rejected bids other than that of bidder i need to be considered. For 
example, if bidder i is awarded three units, then the chosen prices are from the last 
                                                 




three rounds in which bidder i has not reduced her demand18. Also,  pt*  needs to be 
excluded because it is not a rejected bid. Now, let  Ri be the sum of the prices in the 
last i
t
x  rounds where i ∉  Dt , excluding round t*.  Then the VCG price bidder i ≠ j 
pays for i
t
x  units is Ri. This leads us to the next theorem. 
 






∑ - Pt* 
                    
Here no unit is awarded to bidder j ∈  Dt* , the bidder with complementarities. Now, 
let yi be the number of units awarded to bidder i ≠ j. As before, to calculate VCG 
prices the opportunity costs need to be determined. Since the bidder with 
complementarities is the marginal bidder, any alternative efficient allocation should 
always include the marginal bidder. The important issue here is that when bidder i is 
awarded lesser units than the unit of complementarities, i.e., yi < K, the alternative 
efficient allocation would require K – yi units to be taken away from bidders other 
than i who have the lowest K – yi values amongst the allocated units. Thus, the 
opportunity cost of allocating these units to bidder i is the value of the K units of 
complementarities19 less the lowest K – yi valuations. If  yi = K, then the opportunity 
cost is simply the value of the K units of complementarities. Finally, for yi > K, the 
opportunity cost is the sum of the top yi rejected bids other than that of bidder i which 
includes the value of the K units of complementarities. 
 
                                                 
18 This simply means that we use prices of those periods where i does not belong to the drop-out set. 




Thus, if  yi > K then i’s VCG price should be KPt*  for K units and the clinching prices 
for the rest of  yi – K units20. If yi = K then it is KPt* . Now, suppose yi < K. Let Ti be 
the sum of K – yi  prices in rounds where i ∉  Dt , starting from round t and excluding 
round t*. Then bidder i’s VCG price is pi = KPt* – Ti. Having shown what the VCG 
prices should be, equivalence between these prices and the ones computed using our 
mechanism should be an obvious implication. 
 
Corollary 1.1: 
The prices computed under Case I and II are  the VCG payments, which are equal to 
the opportunity costs of allocating units to any particular bidder. 
 
Now that I have shown that the prices in my model are actually the corresponding 
VCG prices, the last important issue that needs to be addressed is the efficiency of the 
allocation. The next Theorem proves that the allocation in both the two cases are ex-
post efficient, which renders uniqueness to the proposed auction design. 
 
Theorem 2: 
The final allocations in both Case I and II are ex-post efficient. 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
                                                 
20 If  yi > K, then i has to pay the top yi rejected bids other than that of her own. This should include the 
value of the K units of complementarities, which are rejected under this allocation. Bidder i should 
already have clinched yi – K units by the time the auction reaches round  t , and thus should pay the 




In the next section, the example presented at the beginning of the paper is revisited to 
illustrate the workings of the proposed algorithm. 
 
2.5.   The Numerical Example Revisited 
 
Let us consider the example presented in section 1. Table 2.1 in section 1 gives the 
marginal values of each unit. Given these valuations, the efficient allocation should 
assign 2 units to each of bidder 2, 3 and 4, the corresponding Vickrey prices being 14, 
13 and 14 respectively.  The objective here is to emulate the same results by using an 
ascending auction and making sure that no excess information is revealed. 
 
The auction proceeds as follows. At every round, prices are announced and demands 
are reported. Price increases as long as there is excess demand (rounds 1,2,3,4). 
Excess demand changes to excess supply at round 5. Therefore, t* is 5. Price increases 
further to round 6 when demand is exactly equal to M – K. Therefore, t = 6. Also, 
round t is round 3 where demand equals M + K – 1 (= 8). 
 
Table 2.3: Proposed Auction Outcome: 
Round Price x1 x2 x3 x4 X Dt Ct 
1 0 6 6 6 6 18 - - 
2 2 3 2 2 2 9 1,2,3,4 - 




4 5 3 2 1 1 7 4 1-1;2-1 
5 6 0 2 1 1 4 1 - 
6 10 0 1 1 1 3 2 - 
 
Allocation:  The M – K(= 3) units that are demanded at round t (=6) are allocated to 
the bidders who have positive demand at round t ; thus bidder 2 gets 1 unit, bidder 3 






∑ - Pt* (=19). 
Thus i ∈  Dt gets 1 unit each ∀ t  ∈ [ t , t ], t ≠ t*. It is inferred from Table 2 that bidder 
3  ∈ D3, bidder 4  ∈ D4 and bidder 2  ∈ D6. Thus bidders 3,4 and 2 get one more unit 
each. The final allocation therefore is as follows; bidder 1 gets 0 unit, bidders 2,3 and 
4 get 2 units each. 
 
Prices: This is Case II with yi < K ∀ i. Using table 2, Ti’s can be calculated as 
follows; T2 = 4, T3 = 5 and T4 = 5. Therefore bidder 2 pays 18 – 4 = 14, bidder 3 pays 
18 – 5 = 13 and bidder 4 pays 18 – 4 = 14.  
The final outcome here is as follows; bidder 2 gets 2 units at a price of 14, bidder 3 
gets 2 units at a price of 13 and bidder 4 gets 2 units at a price of 14. Thus, the new 
algorithm achieves the efficient allocation and the Vickrey prices without asking the 
bidders to reveal their entire demand schedule. 
 
In the next section, I relax the assumption that only one bidder exhibits 




exhibit complementarities and present the revised allocation and price computational 
algorithms. 
 
2.6.   Multiple Bidders with Complementarities 
 
There are two possibilities worth analyzing when multiple bidders exhibit 
complementarities. One possibility is that multiple bidders have average valuation 
among the top M valuations and, the bidder who has the lowest average value, is the 
marginal bidder. I will refer to this situation as Single Marginal Bidder. The second 
possibility is that multiple bidders have the same average valuation but different units 
of complementarity at the margin. I will refer to this situation as Multiple Marginal 
Bidders. In the first case, just like before, the important question to ask is whether the 
marginal bidder is going to be allocated any units or not. However, to address the 
issue, more information might be needed, which implies that the auction might have 
more bidding rounds. In the second case, due to the multiplicity of marginal bidders, 
it has to be simultaneously determined whether it is efficient to allocate units to the 
marginal bidder and which marginal bidder that should be. Again, more information 
might be needed to answer these questions, though the maximum information 
required in the second case is less than that required in the first case. In what follows, 






2.6.1.   Single Marginal Bidder  
 
In this case, there are multiple bidders with complementarities whose average value 
lie in the top M valuation but there is only one marginal bidder with 
complementarities. Let i be the marginal bidder who has complementarity over Ki 
units. Thus, when price reaches bidder i’s average value, in round t*, there is a 
decrease in aggregate demand by Ki units, creating excess supply. Now, under normal 
circumstances, the price would go up  till demand reaches M – Ki. However, with 
multiple bidders exhibiting complementarity, the demand might never equal M – Ki. 
The following list of valuations illustrates such a situation. 
 
22, 21, 20, 19, 18, 17, 16, 16, 15, 15, 15, 14, 14, 13, 12, 11, 10, . . .          (Ex. 2.6.1.1) 
 
12 units are being auctioned off (M = 12). The underlined values represent the 
average values of bidders with complementarities. The marginal bidder has an 
average value of 14. Clearly, the aggregate demand never equals M – Ki, which is 10.  
 
The important issue that needs to be addressed here is similar to the one dealt with 
before. I need to figure out whether it is efficient to allocate units to the marginal 
bidder or not. If, in any bidding round, demand equals M – Ki, then the auction ends 
there and the efficient allocation and the prices are calculated just like the single 
bidder case21.  
                                                 
21 There might be a multiple unit drop in demand in this case after round t*. Accordingly, to calculate 
the efficient allocation, this has to be taken into account by multiplying the price in such rounds by the 







If demand is equal to M – Ki in any of the bidding rounds, then the allocation and 
price algorithm outlined before can be used to compute the efficient allocation and 
the VCG prices for the multiple bidder with complementarities case. 
 
The more interesting case is when the demand is never equal to M – Ki, like the one 
illustrated in example 2.6.1.1. Let L denote the number of units that have the top M 
values. Due to the presence of complementarities, L has to greater than M. In example 
2.6.1.1,  M = 12 and L = 13. Now, if  it is efficient to allocate units to the marginal 
bidder, then L – M units from the top M have to be sacrificed. Similarly, if it is 
inefficient to allocate units to the marginal bidder, then the rejected top M – (L – Ki) 
units should be included in the top M.22 These L – M units from the top M and the 
rejected top M – (L – Ki) units give us the total value that would be generated if the K 
units are not allocated to the marginal bidder. Thus, to compute the efficient 
allocation, the auction algorithm should be able to determine the values of these L – 
M units from the top M and the rejected top M – (L – Ki) units. In example 2.6.1.1, if 
the marginal bidder is included in the final allocation, then 1 (= L – M) unit, which 
has a higher value, has to be excluded. On the other hand, if the marginal bidder is 
excluded from the final allocation, then 1 (= M – L + Ki) unit, which has a lower 
value, has to be included in the final allocation. 
                                                 
22 L – Ki  gives the number of units in the top M without the marginal bidder. Thus, M – (L – Ki) gives 





Using the auction algorithm discussed in previous sections, in round t*, there is excess 
supply for the first time. Thus, the aggregate demand in round t*-1, Xt*-1, should give 
us L. Similarly, Xt*, aggregate demand in round t*, gives us L – Ki. Once these are 
known, they could be used to determine t  and t , which are needed to calculate the 
efficient allocation and the prices. More specifically, round t  should be such that X t – 
Xt*-1 = M – (L – Ki) – 1. Interestingly, round t  in this new algorithm is exactly similar 
to the one calculated before, with tX = M + Ki – 1, and gives us the top M – (L – Ki) 
rejected bids. In example 1.4.1, tX = 12 + 2 – 1 = 13. Thus round t  is the bidding 
round where the bidder with marginal value 13 reduces her demand. 
 
The more challenging task is to determine t . Before the auctions ends, the value of 
the L – M units need to be determined that the marginal bidder would replace from 
the top M, if she is included in the final allocation. Thus, after round t*, price is 
increased further till aggregate demand is reduced by L – M units. Now, in the single 
bidder with complementarities case, this implies that Xt* – tX = L – M, or, tX = M – 
Ki. In the multiple bidders with complementarities case, this is not that 
straightforward. In such situations, aggregate demand might never be reduced by 
exactly L – M units due to the presence of multiple bidders with complementarities. 
To get around this potential problem, the following intuition is used. Let us suppose 
that there is a multiunit demand reduction in a round after round t* which is greater 




excluded from any efficient allocation. Our goal here is to determine exactly L – M 
units that might be replaced by the marginal bidder. If a bidder has higher units of 
complementarities, she could not be replaced by the marginal bidder, and thus, she 
would always be a part of any efficient allocation. This is formally stated in Result 1. 
 
Result 1: 
If there is a reduction in demand greater than L – M units after round t
*
, then 
efficiency requires the corresponding bidder to be awarded those many units.  
 
Consequently, these rounds do not influence the decision on how to allocate the 
marginal units. Thus, I ignore such rounds and concentrate on those bidding rounds 
only, where the aggregate reduction in demand from round t* onwards, has been less 
than L – M units. Round t  is reached when the aggregate reduction in demand, from 
round t*+1 up to round t  is exactly equal to L – M units, excluding those rounds 
where the reduction in demand exceeds L – M. The worst possible situation, in terms 
of the length of the bidding process, would be the case where all the other bidders 
with complementarities have to be ignored while calculating t . In such situations, t  
could only be reached after all such bidders have reduced their demand, implying that 
the aggregate demand in round t  is equal to M - ∑jKj, where kj’s are the units of 
complementarities exhibited by the multiple bidders. Going back to example 2.6.1.1, 
L – M = 1 and I have reductions of 3 and 2 units after round t*. Thus, these round 
have to be ignored and auction ends at round t  when the bidder with marginal value 




example, the auction would end earlier, implying that lesser amount information 
would be revealed. 
 
22, 21, 20, 19, 17, 17, 16, 16, 15, 15, 15, 14, 14, 14, 13, 12, 11, 10, . . .    (Ex. 2.6.1.2) 
 
In this example, M = 12, L = 14 and M – ∑jKj = 12 – 10 = 2. However, I have a 
reduction of 3 (>L – M = 2) units when the bidder with average value 15 reduces her 
demand. According to the algorithm discussed above, this round is ignored and I 
proceed to the next round where I have a reduction of 2 units in the aggregate 
demand. Thus the auction ends in this round where the bidder with average value 16 
reduces her demand. Therefore, in this situation, even though I do not have a bidding 
round where aggregate demand equals M – Ki, the auction would end before demand 
equals M – ∑jKj. Thus, I see that in situations involving multiple bidders with 
complementarities but a single marginal bidder, more information might be needed, 
which calls for more bidding rounds. Consequently, to make this new auction more 
effective in such situations, a sufficient condition would be M >> ∑jKj.   
 
2.6.1.1.  Allocation 
Just like before, there are two possibilities here. One possibility is that the marginal 
units are awarded to the bidder with complementarities. Another possibility is that the 
marginal bidder is excluded from the final allocation. However, in both these two 
cases, the bidders with positive demand in the last bidding round (round t ) get the 




L – M units of complementarities and are in the top M, are awarded the units they 
demand.  
 
Now, while computing the efficient allocation, I need to make sure that I exclude 
bidders with greater than L – M units of complementarities from our calculations. To 
this extent, I construct the set of Exclusions for every round after round t*. This set 
simply gives us the drop out prices of those bidders who have greater than L – M 
units of complementarities. 
 
(5)     Exclusions at round t>t* ; Et = { Pt ∀ t / Xt-1 – Xt > L – M ; 0 otherwise}  
The algorithm for allocating the remaining Ki units is as follows: 



























∑  ; then i ∈  Dt*  gets the remaining Ki units 













∑ ; then j ∈  Dt  gets Xt-1 –  Xt ∀ t  ∈ [ t , t ];          
                                                                  t ≠ t*and t such that Et = 0 
 
In both the above examples, the marginal bidder would be excluded from the final 







2.6.1.2  Prices 
 




























Bidders other than i get whatever they demand at the last round, i.e., bidder j ≠ i gets 
j
t
x  units. Also, bidders who have greater than L – M units of complementarities, are 
awarded the units they demand, i.e., if Et ≠ 0, then j ∈  Dt gets Xt-1 – Xt units. Now, let 
xj be the number of units that bidder j ≠ i wins. Also, let Rj be the sum of the prices in 
the last xj rounds where j ∉  Dt , excluding round t*. Bidder j pays Rj. 
Only Provisional Current Clinches made by bidder j ≠ i in rounds t < t are honored. 
 














Here bidder i ∈  Dt* gets zero unit. Now, let yj be the number of units awarded to 
bidder j ≠ i. If  yj > Ki then j pays KiPt*  for Ki units and the clinching prices for the 
rest of  yj – Ki units. If  yj = Ki then j pays KiPt*. Suppose yj < Ki. Let Tj be the sum of 
Ki – yj  prices in rounds where j ∉  Dt , starting from round t , excluding round t*. 
Then bidder j pays pj = KiPt*  – Tj  
As before, only Provisional Current Clinches made by bidder j ≠ i in rounds t < t are 
honored. 
 






In the multiple bidders with complementarities case, truthful bidding or wait-until-
price-equals-value strategy is still a Best Response equilibrium strategy. 
 
Theorem 3.2: 
The prices computed are the VCG prices and the allocation is ex post efficient. 
 
Proof:  See Appendix 
 
2.6.2.   Multiple Marginal Bidders 
 
In this case, multiple bidders have the same average valuation but different units of 
complementarities at the margin. Thus, when the price equals this average value (in 
round t*), there is a drop in demand by ∑jKj units, where Kj’s are the units of 
complementarities. The following example illustrates such a situation.  
 
22,21,20,19,18,17,17,16, 15,15,15, 15,15, 15,15,15,15, 13,12,11,. . .        (Ex. 2.6.2.1) 
 
In this example, 9 units are being auctioned off and I have 3 marginal bidders with 
the same average value of 15. The multiplicity of the marginal bidders in situations 
like this presents us with a problem that cannot be solved with the algorithms 




algorithm to determine how many of these marginal bidders are to be included in the 
final allocation, if at all, and which ones these should be. 
 
As far as efficiency is concerned, an important point to note is the fact that if it is 
inefficient to allocate units to one particular bidder with complementarities, then it 
will also be inefficient to allocate units to any other bidder who has higher units of 
complementarities but the same average valuation. If units are allocated to a marginal 
bidder with complementarities, then some values higher than her average value are 
excluded from the allocation. Now, if units are allocated to a bidder with higher units 
of complementarities but the same average value, then the only difference is that 
some more values higher than the common average value are being sacrificed. Thus, 
if including the bidder with fewer units of complementarities is inefficient, it has to 
be the case that the inclusion of some other bidder with higher units of 
complementarities but the same average value, is also inefficient. This is stated 
formally in the following result. 
 
Result 2:  
In the multiple marginal bidder with same average value case, if it is inefficient to 
allocate units to a particular marginal bidder, then it has to be the case that it is 






For the simplicity of exposition, let us arrange the units of complementarities in an 
ascending order, K1, K2,…, and so on, where K1 is the lowest. Let bidder i be the 
bidder with K1 units of complementarities. After there is a multiunit demand 
reduction in round t*, following the initial algorithm, price is increased further till the 
aggregate demand equals M – K1. Using this algorithm, it can also be figured out 
whether it is efficient to allocate the K1 units to bidder i. If it is inefficient to allocate 
these units to bidder i, then, from Result 2, it is also inefficient to allocate any unit to 
the other bidders who exhibit complementarities. Then the auction ends when demand 
equals M – Ki  and none of the bidders who exhibit complementarity gets any unit. 
However, if it is efficient to allocate the K1 units to bidder i, then the auction proceeds 
and price increases further till demand equals M – K2, where K2 is the second lowest 
unit of complementarities. Again, using the algorithm from the previous section, it 
can be easily determined whether it is efficient to allocate the K2 units to  the 
corresponding bidder. Just like before, if it is inefficient to allocate the K2 units to the 
bidder with complementarities, it would be inefficient to allocate any units to the 
other bidders who exhibit higher units of complementarities. Thus, bidder i is 
awarded K2 units and the auction ends when demand equals M – K2. However, if it is 
efficient to allocate the units to the bidder with K2 units of complementarities, then the 
auction proceeds further.  
 
Thus, in such cases, there might be a recursive process in which units are allocated to 
some marginal bidder not only if it is efficient to do so, but also if it is inefficient to 




complementarities. Thus, in such cases, either none of the marginal bidders are 
awarded any units, or, only one marginal bidder is awarded the units based on 
whether it is efficient to do so and whether it is inefficient to allocate any units to the 
marginal bidder who has the next higher units of complementarities. Here also, more 
information and consequently more bidding rounds might be necessary. More 
specifically, if it is efficient to allocate units to marginal bidder i only, then the 
auction ends when demand equals M – Kl, where l is the marginal bidder with next 
highest units of complementarities. The worst case is when price has to go up so that 
the demand equals M – Max{Kj}. Consequently, to make this new auction more 
effective in such situations, a sufficient condition would be M >> Max{Kj}. 
 
An interesting observation in situations like these is the fact that the final round of the 
auction and the efficient allocation are determined simultaneously. The auction 
algorithm that is used here is almost similar to the one used for the single bidder with 
complementarities case. At round t*, there is a reduction in demand by all the 
marginal bidders and there is excess supply for the first time. Using the ordering of 
the units of complementarities, price is increased further until demand equals M – K1, 
where K1 is the lowest unit of complementarities. If it is inefficient to allocate these 
K
1 units to the corresponding bidder, then the auction ends at this round where X t = M 
– K
1. Consequently, this auction can be treated exactly like an auction with this bidder 
with K1 units of complementarities as the single marginal bidder.  Thus, the efficient 
allocation and the prices could easily be computed using the algorithm discussed 




price needs to be increased further until demand equals M – K2, where K2 is the 
second lowest unit of complementarities. Now, if it is inefficient to allocate these K2 
units to the corresponding bidder, then, for all practical purposes, the auction ends at 
the previous round where X t = M – K
1. However, if it is efficient to allocate the K2 
units, then again price have to be raised until demand equals M – K3. Thus, the 
auction algorithm in such situations functions as a recursive process and stops only 
when it is inefficient to allocate units to a marginal bidder. If it is efficient to allocate 
units to all the marginal bidders before the one with the maximum units of 
complementarities, then this auction simply can be treated as an auction with the 
bidder with the maximum units of complementarities as the only marginal bidder. 
 
In example 2.6.2.1, there is a reduction of 9 units at round t*. Now, using the 
algorithm discussed above, I increase price further until demand equals M – K1 = 9 – 
2 = 7, i.e., the bidder with value 16 has reduced her demand. Here, it is efficient to 
allocate 2 units to the corresponding marginal bidder ( 15+15 > 16+13 ). Thus auction 
proceeds further until the demand equals M – K2 = 9 – 3 = 6. It is inefficient to 
allocate units to the bidder with 3 units of complementarities (15+15+15 < 
17+16+13). Thus, for all computational purposes, the round where demand equals M 
– K








2.6.2.1   Allocation 
 
The allocation problem with multiple marginal bidders is very similar to the one with 
a single bidder with complementarities. The only difference here is that we might 
have to increase price one extra round to make sure we have the efficient allocation. 
However, once it has been determined which marginal bidder, if any at all, gets the 
units she demand, the rest of the allocation process is exactly similar to the single 
bidder with complementarities case. Thus, it is quite unnecessary to model a separate 
allocation algorithm for situations with multiple marginal bidders. 
 
2.6.2.2   Prices 
 
The prices paid by the winning bidders in the multiple marginal bidders’ case can be 
computed by using the same algorithm that was used to compute those paid by the 
bidders in the single bidder with complementarities case. Once the efficient allocation 
has been determined, the multiple marginal bidder problem essentially becomes a 
single marginal bidder problem where all but one marginal bidders are excluded from 
the final calculations23. Thus, to compute the prices in such situations, the same 
algorithm is proposed that was discussed in the section 2.4. 
 
Theorem 4.1: 
In the multiple marginal bidders case, truthful bidding or wait-until-price-equals-
value strategy is still a Best Response equilibrium strategy. 
                                                 
23 Eventually, only one of the multiple marginal bidders could be allocated the units demanded. Thus, 
in such situations, all the other marginal bidders are excluded from the relevant computations. If none 
of the marginal bidders get the units they demand, then only the marginal bidder with the lowest units 






The prices computed are the VCG prices and the allocation is ex post efficient. 
 
Proof:  See Appendix.  
 
In the following section, a very simple Linear Programming formulation of the 
assignment problem in auction with single marginal bidders with complementarities 
is presented. 
 
2.7.   Linear Programming Approach 
 
The assignment problem that the auctioneer faces in a multiunit auction could also be 
modeled as a Linear Programming Problem (LPP), more specifically, as a Knapsack 
Problem(KP). Formally, a KP is defined as follows: We are given an item set N, 
which consists of n items j with profit pj and weight wj and a maximum capacity 
value c. The objective is to select a subset of N such that the total profit of the 
selected units is maximized and the total weight of the selected units do not exceed c. 










subject to   ,
















∑                               (2.7.1) 
The optimal solution vector is often denoted by x* = ( * *1 ,...., nx x ) and the optimal 
solution value by z*.  
 
Let us suppose that the item set N consists of the entire set of reported values in an 
auction. Thus, an item j in this set would be a bid placed by some bidder. The 
associated profit pj for item j would be the value of the reported bid, bj. The weight wj 
of the item would be the number of units the bid was placed for. Usually, with non-
increasing values, wj would just be one. The only exception to this would be the case 
where a bidder has increasing marginal values and places an all-or-nothing bid for a 
bundle of units. In that case wj would be the units of complementarities. The decision 
variable xj denotes whether the bid is selected in the final allocation or not; xj=0 
implies exclusion and xj=1 implies inclusion. Since only M units are being auctioned 
off, the maximum capacity value, c, should be equal to M.  
 
With these minor adjustments, the KP can be rewritten as: 





subject to   ,




















This exactly depicts the auction allocation problem. The optimal solution in the 
context of auction simply refers to the efficient allocation of units. 
 
Like all LPP, the KP also has quite a few algorithmic solution techniques. The KP 
stands out as one of the simplest forms of LPP. A common intuitive interpretation of 
the problem is ‘packing items into a knapsack which has a fixed capacity, so as to 
maximize the utility from the packed items’. Once we think of KP as a ‘profitable 
packing of items into a knapsack problem’, an intuitive approach for a good solution 







= , and put items with  highest efficiency into the knapsack. Clearly, these 
items generate the highest profit while consuming the lowest amount of capacity. One 
of the algorithmic techniques used to solve a KP is called the Greedy Algorithm, 
which uses the exact same logic. First the items are arranged in a decreasing order of 
efficiency such that 






≥ ≥ ≥                                                             
The idea behind the Greedy Algorithm is to start with an empty knapsack and go 
through the items in this decreasing order of efficiency, adding the item under 
consideration if the capacity constraint is not violated. 
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Consider a KP with c = 9 and n = 7 with the following profit and weight values:                                  
                                  Table 2.5: KP Example 1 
j 1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
pj 
wj 
6      5      8      9      5      7      3 
2      3      6      8      5      9      4 
 
If the Greedy Algorithm is applied to this KP, items 1, 2 and 7 would be selected 
yielding a profit zG = 14, which is the optimal solution for this problem.  
 
However, one concern regarding this particular solution algorithm is the “quality” of 
the solution computed. The solution computed by the Greedy Algorithm does not 
necessarily have to be the optimal solution. In fact, it could be distinctly inferior to 
the optimal solution. For example, if we modify the above numerical example a little, 
we could show that the Greedy Algorithm fails to deliver the optimal solution..  




                                 Table 2.6:  KP Example 2 
j 1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
pj 
wj 
6      5      8      9      6      7      3 
2      3      6      7      5      9      4 
 
The above table presents the previous KP with profit value for the 5th item and the 
weight value for the 4th item altered (the ones in red). If we apply the Greedy 
Algorithm to solve this problem, we will see that we have the same solution as 
before. However, now this solution is suboptimal because it yields a lower profit zG = 
14 than the optimal profit z* = 15. Fortunately, this “quality of the solution” issue 
does not affect the Greedy Algorithm solution for multiunit auctions which are 
modeled as KPs. We will revisit this issue shortly when we discuss how Greedy 
Algorithms could be used to solve multiunit auctions. 
 
To tackle the sub-optimality of the Greedy Algorithm, an extended form of the 
Greedy Algorithm is used sometimes to improve the “quality” of the solution. 
Though this extension does not necessarily yield the optimal solution to all KPs, it is 
an improvement over the Greedy Algorithm in some situations.  This modification is 
called the Extended Greedy Algorithm which consists of running Greedy first and 
then comparing the solution with the highest profit value of any single item. The 
larger of the two is finally chosen as the solution produced by Ext-Greedy Algorithm. 
This solution value is denoted as zEG and for the Ext-Greedy Algorithm, the following 





                                zEG = Max {zG, Max { pj│ j = 1,…….., n}} 
Consider the following KP with c = 6 and n = 5 with the following profit and weight 
values: 
                                  Table 2.7:  KP Example 3 
j      1      2       3       4      5       
pj 
wj 
     3      5      12      2      1      
     1      2       6       3      4      
 
For this problem, the Greedy Algorithm would yield the solution zG = 10 with items 
1, 2 and 4 being chosen. However, clearly the optimal solution is z* =  12 with item 3 
being chosen only. Now, if we run the Ext-Greedy algorithm, that would give us the 
solution zEG = 12 which is the optimal solution for this problem. Thus, we see that for 
some KP, the Ext-Greedy Algorithm improves upon the Greedy Algorithm and might 
yield the optimal solution. 
 
As we have discussed earlier, a multiunit auction can also be interpreted as a KP; (2) 
above gives us the exact mathematical formulation. Let us suppose that we have a 
multiunit auction with 3 bidders and 4 units and the marginal values are given by the 
following table:                                        









                                       Table 2.8:  Marginal Values 





Let us also suppose that there is truthful bidding so that the true values can be used as 
bids. The KP formulation of this problem would have n = 12 and c = 4 with the 
following profit and weight values: 
 
                      Table 2.9:  KP Formulation 
j  1      2       3      4      5      6      7     8     9     10     11     12 
pj 
wj 
12    11     10     9      8      7      6     5     4      3       2       1 
 1      1       1      1      1      1      1     1     1      1       1       1     
 
This is an auction without any complementarities which imply that the weight values 
of each item are 1. Thus, arranging the items in decreasing order of efficiency simply 
means arranging the bids in decreasing order of values. If the Greedy Algorithm is 
used to find the solution to this problem, items 1, 2, 3 and 4 would be chosen with zG 
= 42 which also happens to be the optimal solution z*. Due to the fact that all the 
items have unit weights and are arranged in decreasing order of true/reported values, 
in all auctions with non-increasing marginal values, the Greedy Algorithm solution is 
always the optimal solution. 
 




    12     11      6       2          
     9       8       7       1   




The more interesting case is when increasing marginal values are present. With  
complementarities, we could have bidders demanding package of units, which implies 
that some items could have non-unitary weight values. This could potentially lead to 
the sub-optimality of the Greedy Algorithm solution. The following example 
illustrates such a situation. 
                      
                      Table 2.10: KP Example with Complementarities 
j  1      2       3      4      5      6      7     8     9     10     11     12 
pj 
wj 
12    11     10    19     8      7      6     5     4      3       2       1 
 1      1       1      2      1      1      1     1     1      1       1       1     
 
The Greedy Algorithm would pick items 1, 2, 3 and 5 with a total profit zG = 41. The 
optimal solution for this problem however is to choose items 1, 2 and 4 with z* =  42. 
This is an auction with complementarities with the fourth bid being a package bid for 
2 items. Thus we see that in auctions with complementarities or increasing marginal 
values, the Greedy Algorithm might yield a sub-optimal outcome.  
 
To continue our discussion on auctions with complementarities, let us consider the 
reduced form Marginal Auction Problem (MAP) as discussed earlier. This is a simple 
thought experiment where the N unit auction with a single bidder with 
complementarities is broken down into a hypothetical N – K unit auction followed by 
a K unit auction, K being the units of complementarities. Assuming truthful bidding, 
N – K units would be allocated to the top N – K bids in the first auction. Thus, these 




would be to determine whether to allocate the K remaining units to the bidder with 
complementarities or not. This is exactly similar to the marginal allocation problem in 
the original N unit auction and thus is referred to as the MAP. Interestingly, in such 
auctions with complementarities, the important issue is to find an efficient solution 
for the MAP, the allocation of the remaining units being the same under any efficient 
allocation.  
 
Just like other auction problems, we could use 2.7.2 to express the MAP as a KP. 
However, the Greedy Algorithm is not the best solution algorithm for such problems 
because it might yield sub-optimal outcomes in some instances. Instead, a simple 
extension of the Greedy Algorithm that we discussed before, the Extended Greedy 
Algorithm, could be used to optimally solve all such problems. Let us try to explain 
this result with the help of the following illustrative example:  
 
                      Table 2.11:  Extended Greedy Algorithm 
j  1      2       3      4      5      6      7     8     9     10     11     12 
pj 
wj 
12    11     32     8      7      7      6     5     4      3       2       1 
 1      1       3      1      1      1      1     1     1      1       1       1     
 
This is a MAP with 4 bidders where the auctioneer has to decide how to allocate 3 
units at the margin. If the Greedy Algorithm is used, then items 1, 2 and 4 would be 
picked with zG = 31. However, the optimal solution for this problem is to pick item 3 
with z* = 32. If the Extended Greedy Algorithm is used instead, it would yield zEG = 




Extended Greedy Algorithm improves upon the Greedy Algorithm solution to yield 
the optimal outcome for all MAP. 
 
To conclude our discussion on KP and auction algorithms, we would like to point out 
a couple of important results. The Greedy Algorithm would give us the efficient 
allocation for non-increasing marginal value auctions but the same might not be so 
effective when complementarities are present. For auctions with increasing marginal 
values or complementarities, the Extended Greedy Algorithm would deliver the 
efficient solution for the MAP even if the Greedy Algorithm fails to do so. 
 
2.8.  Concluding Remarks 
 
The static Vickrey auction has two desirable properties. It allocates the units 
efficiently. Also, it induces truth telling as a dominant strategy. However, the main 
critique for this auction would be the fact that it requires all the bidders to reveal their 
entire demand. Auction theorists have pointed out that this demand revelation aspect 
of the static auction could potentially lead to undesirable outcomes. Using this 
insight, Ausubel extended the static Vickrey results in a dynamic auction setting with 
non-increasing marginal values. This paper also replicates the static Vickrey results in 






The main result of this paper states that the allocation achieved through the proposed 
dynamic mechanism is an efficient one, even when complementarities24 are present. 
Also, since VCG payments are used as prices, truthful bidding is a best response 
equilibrium strategy. Being an ascending price auction, demand revelation is not as 
extreme as the static Vickrey auction. In fact, only that much of information is 
revealed that is necessary to compute the efficient allocation; winning bidders with 
high enough values do not have to reveal their entire demand25.  
 
One possible extension of this model could be to allow for heterogeneous goods and 
package bids. It seems to be a formidable challenge to verify whether a mechanism 
like the one proposed here would work in such settings. Also, this paper solely deals 
with independent, private values. Another possible extension could be examining 
situations like these in an interdependent value setting.  Perry and Reny extend the 
Ausubel auction to allow for interdependent values. A possibility on these lines 
would be to extend the Perry and Reny model to allow for increasing marginal values. 
 
Before I close, I would like to point out a set of experimental studies that are 
particularly relevant. Over the last couple of decades, experimental studies have 
shown that the sealed-bid format outperforms the open-bid one, both in laboratory 
and in field settings, contradicting the theoretical predictions directly26. Cox et al., 
1985, Kagel et al., 1987, and Kagel and Levin, 1993 have all observed overbidding in 
                                                 
24 Captured by increasing marginal values. 
25 Under some special circumstances, the amount of information revealed might be equal to that 
revealed in a closed bid auction. 





sealed bid laboratory studies. Kagel and Levin, 2001, find overbidding relative to the 
dominant strategy in a sealed bid uniform price auction in a laboratory setting. List 
and Reiley, 2001, observe this same result of overbidding on the first unit in a sealed 
bid uniform auction, in a field experiment using data from a sports card show. These 
are particularly relevant for this paper because they provide evidences against the 
theoretical insights which justify the choice of an open bid auction format over a 
sealed bid one.  
  
However, it would be premature to denounce the theoretical predictions on account of 
these findings. A variety of theoretical explanations have also been offered to 
reconcile these anomalous findings. These would be risk aversion27, difference in 
feedback28, externality from winning29 and spite motive30, amongst others. However, 
none of these have pointed out the most serious drawback of the experimental studies. 
Rothkopf, et al, 1990, pointed out that if the bidders apprehend cheating by the 
auctioneer, they will be more reluctant to reveal their true values in sealed bid 
auctions. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1991), and Rothkopf and Harstad (1995) 
also provide models emphasizing the importance of protecting the privacy of 
winners’ valuations. In all of the experimental work cited above, this important aspect 
of possible price manipulation by the auctioneer is overlooked. More specifically, in 
these experiments, the experimenter (or the computer following preset commands) 
played the role of the auctioneer, who had no monetary interest in the revenues 
                                                 
27 See Riley and Samuelson, 1981 
28 See Kagel, Harstad and Levin, 1987 
29 See Ettinger, 2002 and Das Varma, 2002 




earned from the auction.  One extension to this branch of experimental economics 
would be to incorporate this possible price manipulation in an experiment, which 
might yield results similar to the standard theoretical predictions. Ghosh and Lange, 
2006, have designed such an auction experiment to study the effect price 
manipulation on bidding behavior, results from which are expected to improve our 
understanding of important differences between open and sealed-bid auction formats.  
 
Thus, to conclude, I would like to restate that to the best of my knowledge, this is the 
only open bid auction algorithm that deals with the problem of complementarities in a 
multiple homogeneous good environment. Efficiency is achieved and truthful bidding 
is induced as an equilibrium strategy. Though there have been some recent 
developments in the operational research field and more complicated mathematical 
models have been developed, the advantage that this new design enjoys is the 




Chapter 3: Price Manipulation by the Auctioneer: An 
Experimental Study Title of Chapter 3 
 
3.1.    Introduction.  
 
The choice between an ascending open-bid and a closed sealed-bid auction has been 
one of the most debated topics in auction theory. Though the standard auction 
literature prescribes the ascending auction over the sealed-bid one, experimental 
studies have shown that the latter outperforms the former, both in laboratory and in 
field settings. Theoretically, the ascending auction design is more appealing 
compared to its sealed-bid counterpart because it does not require the bidders to 
reveal their entire demand, thus insulating them from any possible manipulation by 
the auctioneer. In addition, due to its dynamic nature, the bidders can update their 
information set every period to ensure more efficient bidding. However, experimental 
studies have shown that the sealed bid format outperforms the open bid one, both in 
laboratory and in field settings. In such experiments, bidders are found to be bidding 
more aggressively in sealed bid auctions which contradicts the theoretical predictions 
directly (see Kagel, 1995 and Davis and Holt, 1993 for useful surveys of auction 
theory and laboratory experiments). Cox et al., 1985, Kagel et al., 1987, and Kagel 
and Levin, 1993 have all observed overbidding in sealed bid laboratory studies. Kagel 
and Levin, 2001, find overbidding relative to the dominant strategy in a sealed bid 
uniform price auction in a laboratory setting. List and Reiley, 2001, observe this same 




experiment using data from a sports card show.  Broadly speaking, these 
discrepancies can be categorized into three stylized facts. Firstly, subjects consistently 
bid more aggressively than predicted by theory in sealed bid first price auctions with 
independent private valuations.31 Secondly, subjects consistently bid more 
aggressively than predicted by theory in sealed bid second price auctions.32 Finally, 
strategic equivalence between English auctions and second-price sealed bid auctions 
fails, with far less overbidding in English auctions than in second price sealed bid 
auctions.33 
 
To reconcile these anomalous results with standard theoretical predictions, a variety 
of explanations have been offered. For first price auctions, it can be shown 
theoretically that if bidders are risk averse, there would be over bidding. Riley and 
Samuelson, 1981, showed that bidders engage in aggressive bidding in first price 
auctions with risk averse preferences. Though this potentially might explain the first 
discrepancy, it completely fails to explain overbidding relative to the dominant 
strategy in second price auctions. More qualitative explanations are advanced by 
Kagel, Harstad and Levin, 1987, where they point out the difference in feedback from 
overbidding in the two auction formats as a possible source of overbidding. They 
argue that since the impact of overbidding is much more immediate in open auctions 
as compared to the closed ones, overbidding is more common in the latter. More 
                                                 
31 See, for example, Holt and Sherman, 2000, who give explicit graphs of measured bid functions in 
this 
  case. 
32 See, for example, Kagel, Harstad, and Levin, 1987. 
33 Again, see Kagel, Harstad, and Levin, 1987 for a good example of clear experimental evidence of 
this 




recently, some behavioral studies have also tried to explain these discrepancies. 
Ettinger, 2002, and Das Varma, 2002, both study auctions where a winning bidder 
might exert externality on a losing bidder. In Ettinger’s paper, the winning bidder has 
incentive to bid more aggressively whereas the losing bidder has incentive to over bid 
in Das Varma’s paper. Morgan et al., 2003, model a spite motive in bidders’ 
preferences which successfully explains the discrepancies. In their model, the losing 
bidder has spiteful incentives which lead to aggressive bidding.  
 
Thus we see that there exists a wide variety of studies trying to explain the observed 
discrepancies. However, a seemingly important aspect has been overlooked from all 
of these studies. The whole premise of superiority of the ascending auction designs 
rests on the fact that less information is revealed in such auctions, which prevents any 
kind of price manipulation or other foul play by the auctioneer. Michael H. Rothkopf, 
Thomas J. Teisberg, and Edward P. Kahn, 1990, pointed out that if the bidders 
apprehend cheating by the auctioneer or if there are going to be subsequent auctions 
or negotiations, bidders will be more reluctant to reveal their true values in sealed bid 
auctions. Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Charles M. Kahn (1991), and Rothkopf 
and Harstad (1995) also provide models emphasizing the importance of protecting the 
privacy of winners’ valuations. However, none of the experimental studies have tried 
to capture this aspect of manipulation by the auctioneer. In all these experiments, the 
experimenter herself is the auctioneer, which right away rules out any apprehension 
about possible foul play by the auctioneer. With the experimenter acting as the 




prices and the allocation according to the rules disclosed at the beginning of the 
experiment. Thus, the most important rationale favoring the open auction over the 
sealed bid auction has not been experimentally verified yet, which also appears to be 
a realistic one. Consequently, in this paper we study the effect of a possibility of 
auctioneer price manipulation on bidding behavior. We choose a single unit sealed 
bid Vickrey auction and a single unit English auction to compare outcomes. There are 
two important reasons to choose these two particular auction formats. First of all, 
theoretically they are equivalent in terms of the final allocation and bidding strategies. 
Equally important is the fact that these are the most common and simple auction 
designs which eliminates any complications that could be caused by more complex 
designs. The experimental design is discussed in further details in the following 
section. However, before moving on to the following section, we would like to point 
out that this analysis does suffer from the risk of oversimplification. As we all know 
that in spite of being the most successful real world application of information 
economics, auction theory is plagued with some problematic technical issues like 
bidder collusion, bid rigging, dummy bidders, and bidding rings, among others. In 
this study however, we are assuming away from such technicalities and concentrating 
on the issue of price manipulation by the auctioneer only. Though this makes our 
analysis somewhat oversimplified, it allows us to isolate the probable effects of such 
price manipulation and study its’ effect on bidding behavior. It also makes sense not 
to incorporate these other issues in the present analysis because most of these issues 
are inherent to any auction design, irrespective of it being a closed or an open one, 




is to experimentally test the effect of the possibility of price manipulation the 
auctioneer on the bidding behavior in both a sealed bid auction and an open bid 
auction. Theory suggests that the bidding behavior in an open auction should remain 
unaffected whereas we should observe less aggressive bidding in sealed bid auctions 
and we expect our experimental results to validate that. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Some preliminary theoretical insights are 
presented in the next section. In the following sections the experimental design along 
with the actual results are presented. The final section provides some concluding 
remarks and scope of future research. 
 
3.2.   Preliminary Theory. 
 
The main objective of this paper is to study the effects of the possibility of price 
manipulation by the auctioneer on bidding behavior. In both the sealed bid Vickrey 
and the open bid English auction, the payments made by the winning bidders are the 
Vickrey payments, which do not depend on their own bids. As pointed out earlier, the 
auctioneer cannot manipulate price in the open bid auction because she does not have 
the required information. In the sealed bid auction, since the bidders submit their 
entire demand schedule to the auctioneer, price manipulation is definitely a 
possibility. One way to model price manipulation would be to assume that after all 
the bids are submitted, the auctioneer determines the winning allocation and then 
instead of charging the Vickrey prices, asks the winning bidders to pay prices slightly 




information regarding the bids submitted by the other bidders. Thus, as long as the 
final price they are asked to pay is lower than their true value, they would be willing 
to pay. However, if the bidders are aware of the fact that the auctioneer is going to 
manipulate price and they would end up paying something that depend on the bids 
they submitted, they would have incentive to shed their bid and adjust their bidding 
behavior accordingly. Thus, truthful bidding is no longer a dominant strategy. Though 
this is an extreme case where the auctioneer manipulates price always, even if we 
model the manipulation as a probabilistic event, we should have the same result of 
demand reduction in sealed bid auction. For example, if we assume that the 
auctioneer manipulates price with a positive probability, we would still have the 
(expected) price dependent on one’s own bid, thus providing incentive for demand 
reduction. Let us suppose that the price paid by bidder i is as follows: 
 
          pi  =  α{V(N\i) –  Σj≠i vj} + (1- α)f(bi); 0 < α < 1; f(bi) ≤  bi; f′(bi) > 0 
 
which is the Vickrey payment with probability α and some function of the bid 
submitted with probability 1- α. Alternatively, we could also have the auctioneer 
charge a price which is just a positive markup over the Vickrey payments. Though 
this form of manipulation might seem to be independent of one’s own bid, a careful 
inspection would reveal quite the opposite. Here, the auctioneer needs to make sure 
that the markup she is going to charge is less than the bidder’s own bid. Thus, to 
ensure that the price charged is incentive compatible, the auctioneer has to take into 




incentive to shed their bid because that would lower the markup. Thus, without any 
loss of generality, we can safely assume that the price manipulation can be modeled 
as above which should lead to demand reduction in sealed bid auctions. 
 
The above situation can be diagrammatically illustrated as follows. For the sake of 
exposition, let us assume that we have only 2 bidders and that f(bi) = bi. Then the 
above price equation can be rewritten as follows: 
    pi  =  α{bj} + (1- α)bi; 0 < α  < 1, 
where bj is the bid submitted by the other bidder. With 2 bidders, if bidder i is the 
winner, then the second highest price is the bid submitted by bidder j. Let us also 
assume that the values are drawn from uniform distribution over [0,1]. If  α = 0, then 
this reduces to a first price auction and the equilibrium bid function is vi/2, where vi is 
bidder i’s value. On the other hand, if α = 1, then this reduces to a second price 
auction and the equilibrium bid function is vi. For 0 < α < 1, even though we do not 
explicitly solve for the exact mathematical form, the equilibrium bid function should 
be a non-increasing function of α bounded by vi above and by vi/2 below. The 
following figure depicts a couple of such functions. Bid function 1 is a linear form, 
which is simply a linear convex combination of the two extreme equilibrium bid 
functions. It is represented by the solid bold line. Bid function 2 is a discontinuous 
function which is equal to the first price bid function for values of α ≤ ½, and is equal 
to the second price bid function for all other values of α. This is represented by the 







3.3.    Experimental Idea. 
 
The purpose of this experiment is to study the effects of auctioneer manipulation on 
bidding behavior. As pointed out in the preceding section, this sort of price 
manipulation affects sealed bid auctions only. With such manipulation by the 
auctioneer, bidders in a sealed bid auction should bid less aggressively compared to 
bidders in the same auction without manipulation. In this study, we have tried to 
capture the effects of two types of price manipulation by the auctioneer, explicit and 
implicit. Explicit manipulation would be the case where the bidders know at the start 
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probability. Under implicit manipulation, the bidders would be aware of the fact that 
the auctioneer’s profits depend on the final price and the winning price would be 
announced by the auctioneer after observing all the bids which only she would have 
access to. Even though auctioneers explicitly informing the bidders about price 
manipulation would never occur in the real world, it serves an important purpose in 
our study. Our study revolves around the idea that the bidders should be aware of the 
fact that the auctioneer might benefit from price manipulation and take that in to 
account while preparing bids. Since the subjects used in our auction are 
undergraduate students, it can be difficult to instill this important concept of 
apprehension about price manipulation. By including the explicit manipulation 
treatment, we try to proxy for the possible lack of expertise and experience of our 
subjects that help real auction bidders to prepare bidding strategies. If the subjects 
quickly grasp the idea that the auctioneer has both incentive and scope to manipulate 
price, then the bidding behavior observed across the explicit and implicit 
manipulation treatments should be identical. If not, then the explicit manipulation 
treatment should produce lower bids compared to the implicit manipulation treatment. 
However, both these treatments should produce bids lower than the no-manipulation 
treatment. Also, with price manipulation, bidding in a sealed bid Vickrey auction 
should be less aggressive than bidding in an open English auction, which otherwise 
should be equivalent. Finally, bidding in an open auction should remain unaffected 
with or without price manipulation. Thus, the objective of this experiment is to test 





In our experiment, we incorporate the possibility of implicit price manipulation by 
randomly assigning participants as auctioneers. Since their final earnings would 
depend on their auction profits, they would have incentives to manipulate the final 
price. Interestingly, the success of this experiment does not rely on the fact that there 
has to be actual price manipulation. In fact, the necessary condition is that the bidders 
apprehend that the auctioneer has incentive and scope to manipulate price. Once the 
bidders become aware of the fact that the auction profit of the auctioneer is her final 
earnings and that she can alter that by choosing an appropriate price, they should 
adjust their bidding behavior accordingly. The baseline treatment is where the 
computer acts as the auctioneer and follows preset commands to choose the second 
highest bid as the winning price. We also have another treatment where a subject 
chosen randomly plays the auctioneer’s role but has to post the second highest bid as 
the final price. Any attempt to post a different price would lead to an automatic 
rejection by the computer program. The purpose of including this treatment is to show 
that the identity of the auctioneer, whether the computer or another fellow subject, 
does not affect the bidding behavior. This was necessary to make sure that even 
though two parameters (identity of the auctioneer and scope of the auctioneer) were 
changed across treatments, it did not affect the results. For example, it could be the 
case that the bidders might want to minimize the human auctioneer’s profit by 
bidding defensively as compared to the computer auctioneer. By comparing the 
results from both these two treatments, we make sure that such strategies are ruled 





There are three treatments in our experiment. The first treatment is the baseline case 
where the subjects are chosen to participate either in a sealed bid second price 
auction. The second and the third treatments incorporate possible price manipulation. 
In the explicit manipulation treatment, the participants play a sealed-bid second price 
auction with the role of the auctioneer being played by the computer. In the implicit 
manipulation treatment, the subjects participate as bidders in a sealed-bid second 
price auction, with the role of the auctioneer being played by a randomly chosen 
subject. The subject auctioneer in this treatment would have the incentive and ability 
to influence price. The bidders participating in this treatment are informed about this 
before the auction starts.  
 
3.4.   Experiment Design 
 
Undergraduate students in the University of Maryland at College Park were used as 
subjects in our auction treatments. The recruitment was done through mailing lists. 
The treatments were run using a software called Z-Tree. Initially, three treatments 
were run; the baseline no-manipulation treatment, the explicit manipulation treatment 
and the implicit manipulation treatment. In each auction round, the bidders were 
competing for a single hypothetical good whose value was given to them before the 
start of each auction round. The bidders’ values were drawn randomly from 0 and 100 
whereas the auctioneer’s values were drawn randomly from 0 and 50. It was also 
made sure that the auctioneer announced a final price even when that price was lower 




their earnings from the ten actual rounds. In addition to that, each of the subjects was 
also paid a $10 show-up fee. Cash payments were made to the participating subjects 
at the end of the experiment. 
 
In the baseline treatment we have one session with twenty participants. The 
participants are randomly divided in to five groups of four bidders in each group. 
There are ten actual auction rounds preceded by two practice rounds. The 
instructions, which were handed out to the participants, were read out before the start 
of the treatment. It explained the auction rules, how the winner and the winning price 
are determined and a couple of illustrating examples. The bidders were informed that 
the computer auctioneer was pre-programmed to choose the second highest bid as the 
winning price. Also, the bidders were informed that their values are randomly drawn 
from 0 – 100 at the beginning of every round. At the beginning of each round, the 
subjects log in to the bid-submit screen on their terminal and get to know their 
randomly assigned value and submit their bid based on that value. Once all the bids 
are submitted, the computer declares the winner and the second highest bid. The 
round ends with a result screen where the subjects get to know the highest bid, 
whether or not they won the round, the winning price and their profits from that 
round. If the subject did not win the auction they will observe a winning price and 
profit of zero. They subjects are asked to note down their value, their own bid, the 
winning price and the profit from the result screen on a separate bid record sheet. The 





In the explicit manipulation treatment, there were twelve participants divided into 
three groups of four bidders. For each group, a pre-programmed computer auctioneer 
was used to announce the winner and determine the final price. The computer 
auctioneer also received a randomly assigned value at each round drawn from 0 – 50.  
As before, there were ten actual auction rounds preceded by two practice rounds. The 
instructions were handed out and read aloud by the experimenter. It was clearly 
mentioned in the instructions that the winning price might not be the second highest 
bid always. Whenever the value of the auctioneer was higher than the second highest 
bid, the auctioneer would manipulate price and charge ninety per cent of the highest 
bid instead. This was just a simple approach to incorporate explicit price 
manipulation. In all other cases, the winning price would be equal to the second 
highest bid, just like in second price auctions. Just like the baseline treatment, the 
bidders would submit their bids from the bid-submit screen and record their value, 
bid, price and profits from the results screen.  
 
In the implicit manipulation treatment, there were eight participants divided into two 
groups of four. In each group, there were one auctioneer and three bidders. The 
participants were informed at the start of the session that the bidders would have 
randomly assigned values drawn form 0 – 100 and the auctioneers would have 
random values drawn from 0 – 50. Also, it was announced that the auctioneers role 
was fixed and that the remaining subjects participating as bidders would be randomly 




continually changing across rounds. To emphasize the implicit manipulation aspect, 
the instructions included the following statement: 
 
“The auctioneer’s main task is to determine the winning price which is the 
second highest bid. The auctioneer would declare the price after reviewing all 
the bids submitted by the bidders in the group. Only the auctioneer would 
have access to these bids and her profit would depend on the price announced; 
more specifically, the higher the price is, the higher is the profit.” 
 
Also, a screenshot of the auctioneer’s price-submit screen was included with the bid-




The baseline treatment results are summarized in the following tables. The first table 
reports P which captures how far apart the actual bid is from the truthful bid, 
expressed as a percentage. So, a lower value of P implies that the actual bid is closer 
to the ruthful bid, the extreme case being p = 0 where the actual bid is equal to the 









Table 3.1: Baseline Treatment: P Values 
P = [1 - Actual Bidding/Truthful Bidding]*100 Frequency Frequency % 
P = 0 127 52.92 
0 < P ≤ 1 35 14.58 
1 < P ≤ 5 34 14.17 
5 < P ≤ 10 9 3.75 
10 < P ≤ 25 14 5.83 
25 < P ≤ 50 4 1.67 
50 < P ≤ 75 3 1.25 
75 < P < 100 9 3.75 
P = 100 5 2.08 
 
Table 3.2:  Baseline Treatment: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obsv. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Proportion 240 8.603987 23.652 0 100 
 
From Table 3.1 we see that more than half of the bidders chose to bid truthfully and 
about sixty five percent of the bidders had bids within ten per cent of the truthful bid 
value. There were five outliers with bids equal to zero. The following graph compares 
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The explicit manipulation treatment results are summarized in the following tables. 
 
Table 3.3:  Explicit Treatment: P Values 
P = [1 - Actual Bidding/Truthful Bidding]*100 Frequency Frequency % 
P = 0 3 2.44 
0 < P ≤ 1 28 22.76 
1 < P ≤ 5 30 24.39 
5 < P ≤ 10 18 14.63 
10 < P ≤ 25 19 15.45 
25 < P ≤ 50 8 6.50 
50 < P ≤ 75 5 4.07 
75 < P < 100 9 7.32 






Table 3.4:  Explicit Treatment: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obsv. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Proportion 120 18.46377 29.31196 0 100 
 
From Table 3.3 we see that the percentage of bidders who chose to bid truthfully have 
gone down drastically and a much higher percentage of bidders prefer to shed their 
bid. Also, from table 3.4, we see that the explicit manipulation treatment has a much 
higher, more than double, mean value for the proportional difference between truthful 
and actual bidding. The following graph compares the outcomes from the explicit 
manipulation treatment with the truthful bidding case. 
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The implicit manipulation treatment results are summarized in the following tables. 
 
Table 3.5:  Implicit Treatment: P Values 
P = [1 - Actual Bidding/Truthful Bidding]*100 Frequency Frequency % 
P = 0 6 8.82 
0 < P ≤ 1 4 5.88 
1 < P ≤ 5 13 19.12 
5 < P ≤ 10 10 14.71 
10 < P ≤ 25 11 16.18 
25 < P ≤ 50 5 7.35 
50 < P ≤ 75 0 0.00 
75 < P < 100 2 2.94 
P = 100 17 25.00 
 
Table 3.6:  Implicit Treatment: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obsv. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Proportion 68 34.28523 41.85321 0 100 
 
From Table 3.5 we see that the percentage of bidders who chose to bid truthfully have 
increased marginally from the explicit manipulation treatment but it is still 
significantly smaller than the baseline treatment. Also, from table 3.6, we see that the 
implicit manipulation treatment has a significantly higher mean value for the 
proportional difference between truthful and actual bidding than both the two 




calls for additional sessions to check for such outliers. The bidding outcome for the 
implicit manipulation treatment is presented in the following graph. 








0 20 40 60 80 100
Actual Bidding Truthful Bidding Truthful Bidding
 
 
3.6.     Concluding Remarks. 
 
In this paper, we studied the effect of price manipulation by the auctioneer on the 
bidding behavior in a sealed bid auction. Our results suggest that bidding behavior in 
the sealed bid auction format is affected by possible price manipulation by the 
auctioneer. As expected, we have a much larger effect with explicit manipulation. 
Both with explicit and implicit manipulation, we have demand reduction compared to 
the no-manipulation, second price auction bidding. Based on these preliminary 




more extensively to validate the theoretical claim of superiority of open auctions over 
sealed bid auctions on the premise that bidders bid sub-optimally in fear of price 
manipulation in sealed bid auctions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
study that tries to analyze this experimentally. As a possible source of future research, 
we would ideally want to expand the scope this present study and analyze similar 
situations in a field experiment setting. One such possibility would be online auctions, 






Proof of Theorem 1: 
 
In this ascending auction model, the bidding strategy of each bidder is simply an 
answer to the question “when to drop out?” Thus, truthful bidding in this model 
simply refers to the drop-when-price-equals-value strategy. Dropping out or reducing 
demand at a price less than the marginal value for that unit would be a case of under-
bidding in our model. Likewise, dropping out or reducing demand at a price greater 
than the marginal value for that unit would be a case of over-bidding in our model.  
Quite understandably, to answer the question “when to drop out?”, the most important 
thing I need to know is what price I will pay if I win any unit. I have already shown 
that the price a winning bidder pays is independent of her own bid, which implies that 
the bidder’s final price is not affected by her decision about when to drop out. The 
other strategic implications that remain to be explored are whether the bidders can do 
better by under or over bidding in terms of  the number of units they win.  
 
The number of units allocated to a bidder in my model is solely determined on the 
basis of efficiency. In fact, the final allocation is the one that generates maximum 
total reported value out of all the possible allocations. Let us suppose that all the 
bidders are using truthful bidding strategies. Now, let us check for any incentive to 
under bid. Clearly, no losing bidder would want to under bid. A bidder winning 
multiple units could have incentive to under bid to win fewer units at a lower price. In 




independent of bids, the price she has to pay for the remaining units are unaffected. 
Thus, under biding to win fewer units could only lead to a loss of surplus for the 
bidder. Thus, even a winning bidder would not want to under bid because the only 
thing that could accomplish is her winning lesser number units, prices for the 
remaining units being unchanged. Also, a losing bidder, by over bidding, could 
ensure winning at least one unit but at a price higher than her value. Similarly, a 
winning bidder could win more units by over bidding but at prices higher than values. 
 
Another potentially problematic bidding strategy could be to place an all-or-nothing 
bid at the margin such that you win those many units. The worst possible case could 
be where the marginal bidder(without complementarities) has the highest losing bid 
also and by placing a package bid, is allocated both the units. For example , …, 8, 7, 
6, 5, 2, …, depicts situations like these where the same bidder has the values 6 and 5. 
Let the marginal bidder’s value for the marginal unit be x and her highest losing bid 
be y. Also, let the second highest losing bid be t and the second lowest winning bid be 
s, where t + s < x + y. Without misreporting the marginal bidder wins 1 unit at  price 
t. However, by misreporting, she can win two units at a price of t + s. To check for 
incentive to misreport, we compare profit from truthful bidding, which is x – t,  to that 
from misreporting, which is (x + y) – (t + s), or, (x – t) + (y – s) . This implies that the 






One last thing that needs to be verified is whether a bidder, who has a winning bid but 
is replaced by the marginal bidder, has any incentive to misreport.  For example, in a 
auction like this, …, 10, 7, 6, 6, 4, …, if 6 is the average value of the marginal bidder, 
bidder i with value 7 has one of the top values but is not awarded any unit. In cases 
like these, there could be incentive to report a bid higher than value to win.  Let us 
suppose that bidder i has 1 top bid with a true value of x. She reports a value x’ in 
order to win the unit. Also, y is the highest losing bid and z average value of 2 units of 
complementarities. Since bidder i did not win any unit with the true value, it must be 
the case that x + y < 2z. Also, since she wins by misreporting, it has to be the case 
that x’ + y > 2z. Prices paid are the VCG payments. Thus, bidder i has to pay 2z – y 
for the unit she wins. However, 2z – y being greater than x, she would have no 
incentive to misreport.  
Thus, we see that no bidder has any incentive to deviate from truthful bidding. 
Therefore, in this model, truthful bidding or wait-till-price-equals-value strategy is an 
equilibrium strategy. 
 
Proof of Theorem 2: 
 
While allocating the units, the main question that needs to be answered is whether 
any unit is going to be allocated to the bidder with complementarities or not. We will 
assume throughout this proof that Theorem 1 holds, which implies that the drop-out 
prices are the marginal value for that unit. In round t*, the number of units of 
complementarities (K) and the average value of these units (Pt*) are revealed. Thus, 




efficient allocation, this value has to be compared with the total value that would be 
generated if these K units were allocated to bidders other than the one with 
complementarities. Now, between rounds t  and t , excluding round t*, the marginal 
value of these K units are revealed through the prices in these rounds. In addition, the 
identities of these bidders are revealed by the set of Drop-outs from each of the 
bidding rounds. Thus, the total value of these K units, allocated to bidders other than 
the one with complementarities, can be computed by summing up these prices from 
round t  to t , leaving out Pt*. Thus, the total value of the K units awarded to bidders 






∑ – Pt*. Therefore, it 






∑ – Pt*, the bidder with 
complementarities gets the K units, the allocation referred to in Case I. The other 






∑ – Pt*, implying that bidders other than the 
one with complementarities should be allocated these remaining K units, the 
allocation referred to in Case II. As mentioned before, the identity of these bidders are 
revealed by the set of Drop-outs for rounds t  through t , leaving out round t*. Each of 
these bidders receives a single unit out of the remaining K units. Thus, we see that the 







Proof of Theorem 3.1 and 3.2: 
 
Using result 1, we know that the bidders who have higher units of complementarities 
(> L – M), do not affect the allocation of the marginal units. The set of Exclusions 
groups together such bidders. Once these bidders with higher units of 
complementarities are accounted for, the allocation algorithm simply selects those 
bidding rounds over which the aggregate demand reduction has been L – M. The 
presence of bidders with lower units of complementarities is not a significant issue. 
These bidders are incorporated into the mechanism by multiplying their drop-out 
price by their multiunit demand, on account of the fact that now their total value over 
these units are relevant and not the average one. Thus, the algorithm operates exactly 
as the one discussed for the single bidder case. The only difference being the presence 
of more bidding rounds due to bidders with higher units of complementarities. 
Consequently, without any changes being made to the treatment of  the MAP, the 
multi bidder algorithm has the same efficiency and truth telling properties of the 
single bidder mechanism. 
 
One issue regarding truth telling needs to be addressed separately for this special 
multi bidder case. Since by reporting a package bid of more than L – M  units any 
bidder is guaranteed to win those many units, it needs to be shown that there is no 
incentive to do so. Let us look at the most likely case where this sort of misreporting 
could be a possibility. Let us suppose that a bidder is winning x units(< L – M) with 
value v, at a price p. By misreporting she could  win y units(>L – M) at a price p’. Her 




that v – p < v’ – p’. However, the additional units that she is winning by misreporting, 
is actually replacing those many units with values higher than her own(simply 
because her bids on those units were losing bids). Since VCG prices are used, p’ 
would charge these replaced values for the additional units she wins. Thus, for these 
additional values, she would end up paying more than her true value and it is always 
the case that v – p > v’ – p’. This proves that there is no incentive to misreport in 
order to take advantage of the fact that higher units of complementarities cannot be 
excluded from the final allocation. 
 
Proof of Theorem 4.1 and 4.2: 
 
From Result 2 we know that only one out of the many marginal bidders would be 
considered to be a part of the final allocation (which is determined using the recursive 
process outlined above). Thus, the multiple marginal bidder case is essentially similar 
to the single marginal bidder case, the remaining bidders having no role in the 
computation of either the final allocation or the prices. Thus, for computational 
purposes, the multiple marginal bidder model reduces to a single marginal bidder 
model, and the allocation and price algorithms used here is exactly similar to those 
used in the single bidder case. This implies that truthful bidding, VCG prices and 
efficiency theorems for single marginal bidder can also be applied in multiple 
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